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Many mutual fund shareholders invest in funds with su-
pracompetitive fees that reduce their expected return even though 
lower cost alternatives are available. While financial arbitrage can 
correct pricing problems for other types of securities, conventional 
arbitrage is difficult to implement in the mutual fund market. As a re-
sult, concerns about excessive fund fees have attracted the attention of 
policy makers, including the SEC. This Article proposes legal reform 
to our system of mutual fund regulation that responds to the problem 
of high-cost funds by providing the investors who are making the 
most substantial mistakes with salient and transparent market infor-
mation about the existence of superior investment alternatives. We 
first consider ways that regulation could be reformed to facilitate what 
we call "short redemption," the mutual fund analog to "short selling" 
of securities. A vibrant market for short redemptions would allow 
smart money to arbitrage fee differences by selling (redeeming) short 
high-fee funds while buying comparable low-fee funds. But because 
of predictable resistance from the shorted funds and the difficulty of 
obtaining shares to borrow, this Article concludes that short redemp-
tion is unlikely to provide sufficient arbitrage discipline of inefficient 
high-fee funds. Instead, this Article proposes regulatory reform that 
would encourage low-fee funds to offer "improved performance 
guarantees." An improved performance guarantee promises that the 
consumer will achieve a better net financial outcome if she switches 
from a current provider to a competitor product. The core notion is to 
guarantee to the consumer an improvement in relative performance. 
The guarantee functions as an arbitrage of high-fee funds that would 
improve price competition in the mutual fund market. The Article's 
central claim is that lawmakers and regulators can enhance competi-
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tion in mutual funds by enabling sophisticated investors to arbitrage 
supracompetitive fees. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Mutual fund investors pay fees for the stock-picking and administra-
tive services provided by the mutual fund manager. Investors hope, of 
course, that superior returns will more than compensate for the price 
paid, but some differences in mutual fund prices cannot be attributed to 
differences in expected return. One stark example is the wide range of 
prices in index funds, which are designed to track a particular market in-
dex at low cost. For example, as of 2012, MainStay Investments' 
(MCSEX) expense ratio on its S&P 500 index fund was more than four 
and a half times larger than the expense ratios that Vanguard (VFINX) 
and Fidelity (FUSEX) charged on their S&P 500 indices (0.81%,0.17%, 
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0.10%, respectively}.1 All three funds attempt to mimic the performance 
of the S&P 500, so investors in these funds are choosing between funds 
that are targeting the same pre-fee return, but doing so at very different 
prices.2 This pricing disparity is just one example of a well-understood 
phenomenon in the mutual fund market: some mutual funds charge su-
pracompetitive prices.3 
Asset management fees are fundamentally important to mutual 
fund investors. Since fees are a constant drag on returns, their effect 
compounds over the course of a career and can lead to very different sav-
ings outcomes. For example, an individual saving $500 a month from the 
age of twenty-five to sixty-five could see their end-of-career savings di-
minished by nearly half as a result of a difference of two percent in fund 
fees. 4 Moreover, empirical studies have shown that few actively managed 
funds justify their fees; in fact high fees are associated with worse pre-fee 
returns.5 Avoiding high costs is, therefore, essential to the retirement sav-
ings goals of millions of investors. As such, mutual fund fees have been a 
subject of long-standing concern. The Investment Company Act of 1940, 
for example, now includes a fiduciary duty regarding fees,6 and the SEC 
has announced enforcement measures targeting costly funds.7 Despite 
this attention, fees in many funds remain stubbornly high. 
Rather than look to regulatory solutions, we begin by asking a more 
fundamental question: how is it that funds that target an identical index 
can charge different prices? Mutual fund shares are securities, and in se-
curities markets for stocks and bonds, when the price of a security ex-
ceeds its fundamental value, sophisticated investors can profit by borrow-
ing shares of that security and selling them short, repurchasing the shares 
after the price declines to pay back the loan.8 This short selling puts 
downward pressure on the price of the security and drives it closer to its 
1. FIDELITY INVESTMENTS, SPARTAN 500 INDEX FuND: SUMMARY PROSPECTUS 2 (Oct. 1, 
2013), available at https://secure.ingham.com/prospectus/FUSVX.pdf (showing an expense ratio of 
0.10%); MAINSTAY INVESTMENTS, PROSPECTUS FOR MAINSTAY EQUITY INDEX FuND 4 (Feb. 28, 
2012), available at http://quote.momingstar.com/fund-filing/Prospectus/2012/2/28/t.aspx?t=MCSEX& 
ft=497&d=12353d7aae7998a95c85794d22c36cd1 (showing total annual fund operating expense ratio of 
0.81); VANGUARD FuNDS, SUPPLEMENT TO THE PROSPECTUSES 1 (Apr. 28, 2014), available at 
http://www.vanguard.com/pub/Pdf/p040.pdf (showing an expense ratio of 0.17% for 2013). 
2. E.g., FIDELITY INVESTMENTS, supra note 1, at 3; MAINSTAY INVESTMENTS, supra note 1, at 
5; VANGUARD FuNDS, supra note 1, at 2. 
3. Javier Gil-Bazo & Pablo Ruiz-Verdu, The Relation Between Price and Performance in the 
Mutual Fund Industry, 64J. FIN. 2153, 2179 (2009). 
4. R. GLENN HUBBARD ET AL., THE MUTUAL FuND INDUSTRY: COMPETffiON AND INVESTOR 
WELFARE 19 tbl.2.1 (2010). 
5. Gil-Bazo & Ruiz-Verdu, supra note 3, at 2178. 
6. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2012). 
7. James G. Cavoli et al., The SEC's Mutual Fund Fee Initiative: What to Expect, 16 WESTLAW 
J. SEC. LmG. & REG., Nov. 16, 2010, at 1, 1. 
8. Robert S. Bloink, Does the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act Rein in Credit Default 
Swaps? An EU Comparative Analysis, 89 NEB. L. REV. 587, 621-22 (2011); see also 17 C.F.R. 
§ 242.200( a) (2014) (defining a short sale as "any sale of a security which the seller does not own or 
any sale which is consummated by the delivery of a security borrowed by, or for the account of, the 
seller"). 
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fundamental value.9 This mechanism of arbitrage is fundamental to price 
efficiency in capital markets. 10 When arbitrage is either prohibitively ex-
pensive or impossible, this corrective mechanism is absent. Because so-
phisticated investors cannot bet against predictably underperforming 
high-fee funds, they persist: 
[T]he only thing an informed investor can do in the market for in-
dex funds is to buy the good-performing funds-no arbitrage is pos-
sible. In such a market, all that is necessary for inferior funds to ex-
ist and grow is a set of uninformed investors and a set of 
distributors who have an economic incentive to sell inferior prod-
ucts. In a market where arbitrage is impossible, we may be disap-
pointed, but we should not be surprised when inferior products ex-
ist and even prosper.11 
The purpose of this Article is to examine the obstacles to arbitrage in the 
mutual fund market, examine the current regulatory environment, 
demonstrate the economic feasibility of mutual fund arbitrage, and sug-
gest regulatory change that would enable effective arbitrage of high-fee 
funds. Such reform would enhance price competition in the mutual fund 
market to the benefit of individual investors who might otherwise pur-
chase high-cost funds. 
This Article begins with an explanation of how conventional arbi-
trage could work in the mutual fund market to enhance competition. If 
borrowing of mutual fund shares were possible at a low cost, sophisticat-
ed investors would be able to borrow shares of MainStay's high-fee mu-
tual fund, promising to return sufficient cash in the future to make the 
lender of shares (more than) whole. The sophisticated borrower would 
redeem the shares from the fund and take the proceeds and reinvest 
them in the comparable low-fee Vanguard index. Such "short redemp-
tions" would allow smart money to arbitrage fee differences by selling 
(redeeming) short high-fee funds while buying comparable low-fee 
funds. High-fee funds, like MainStay, would face increased incentives to 
reduce their fees or risk being figuratively driven from the market by 
waves of redemptions. We explain why conventional short selling-
though legally permissible-is unlikely to solve the supracompetitive fee 
problem in the mutual fund market. The absence of a robust secondary 
market for mutual fund shares, combined with poor incentives for many 
brokers to lend, creates an obstacle to effective short redemption that in-
terferes with arbitrage and protects funds with supracompetitive fees. 
To address the difficulties of arbitrage through short redemptions, 
we argue for a new type of arbitrage, enacted through regulatory reform 
9. EKKEHART BOEHMER & JULIE WU, EDHEC, SHORT SELLING AND THE PRICE DISCOVERY 
PROCESS 8 (2010), available at http://www.edhec-risk.com/edhec_publications/all_publications/RISK 
Review.2011-04-06.2018/attachments/EDHEC%20Working %20paper%20- %20Short%20selling%20a 
nd %20the %20price %20discovery%20process %20F.pdf. 
10. Id. at 5, 15. 
11. Edwin J. Elton et al., Are Investors Rational? Choices Among Index Funds, 59 J. FIN. 261, 286 
(2004). 
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that would enable low-fee funds to offer "improved performance guaran-
tees." An improved performance guarantee promises that the consumer 
will achieve a better net financial outcome if she switches from a current 
provider to a competitor product. The core notion is to guarantee to the 
consumer an improvement in relative performance.12 Intuitively, if two 
funds track the same index, but vary widely in price, then the lower-
priced fund will almost certainly deliver superior after-fee performance 
than the higher-priced fund. In our suggested implementation, low-cost 
funds could offer guarantees that effectively divide some of the benefit of 
improved performance between the low-cost fund and the consumer. 
Since the guarantee enables low-cost funds to profit from their systemat-
ically superior performance while encouraging redemptions from high-
cost funds that serve as guarantee targets, performance guarantees are 
another form of arbitrage. 
Our central claim is that lawmakers and regulators can enhance 
competition in mutual funds by enabling competitors or third-party in-
termediaries to arbitrage differences in expected mutual fund returns. 
Arbitrage can be directly facilitated by enabling investors to combine 
short redemptions of low-expected-return funds with long purchases of 
high-expected-return funds. But arbitrage can also be facilitated by ena-
bling competitor funds or third parties to off er improved performance 
guarantees. For example, in the mutual fund industry, Vanguard might 
offer the following improved performance guarantee to any investor who 
is currently invested in the MainStay index: 
On any funds that you invest in the Vanguard index, we will guar-
antee that after a year you will have more money in your Vanguard 
account than if you left the money invested in the MainStay index. 
More specifically, we promise to reimburse you for one-hundred 
percent of any shortfall in relative performance if you will grant 
twenty percent of any upside in relative performance.13 
Under this guarantee, Vanguard would not be promising that the S&P 
index would be increasing during the next year. It would only be promis-
ing that the Vanguard fund would produce a higher (net of expenses) re-
turn. 
The improved performance guarantee can enhance ex ante price 
competition by credibly communicating to investors that the Vanguard 
index dominates the MainStay index, even if these investors do not ac-
cept the guarantee. Instead of the universal disclaimer that "evidence of 
past performance does not guarantee future performance," a competitor 
would provide a guarantee about relative future performance. Investors 
12. The South African insurance and financial services company Discovery offers a product that 
awards bonuses to investors, if their fund is not in the top quartile of earners. Their "Quartile Perfor· 
mance Protector" product, for example, boost returns up to twenty percent if the fund is in the bottom 
quartile. DISCOVERY INVEST, RETIREMENT PLANS: SAVE OVER THE LONG TERM TO ENSURE 
FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE 4 (2014), available at https://www.discovery.co.za/discovery_coza/web/ 
linked_content/pdfs/invest/discovery_invest_retirement_fact_file.pdf. 
13. This is an example of a fund's improved performance guarantee to investors of a competitor 
fund in order to facilitate arbitrage in expected returns. 
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who switch from the MainStay to Vanguard index without taking the 
guarantee would retain one-hundred percent of the enhanced relative re-
turn. In essence, these investors would be saying, "Thank you for speak-
ing to me credibly about the superiority of your product. I will switch, 
but I do not want to trade the twenty percent of the upside to receive the 
one-hundred percent of downside protection." The mere fact that Van-
guard is able to offer such a guarantee would give these customers suffi-
cient information to choose the lower-priced product. For these inves-
tors, the guarantee offers Vanguard a new, cheap mechanism for 
acquiring new accounts. 
Other investors, however, who-notwithstanding Vanguard putting 
its money where its mouth is-are still worried about whether the Van-
guard index is really a better deal, can accept the guarantee and assure 
themselves of the best of both worlds. By shifting their money to Van-
guard with the guarantee, they can assure themselves of every dollar of 
the MainStay return and still participate in eighty percent of excess Van-
guard return. 
The guarantee also can provide benefits to investors who have a va-
riety of standard cognitive biases. For example, the guarantee provides a 
means of taking the low-cost fund's fee advantage, which tends to be low 
salience for some investors,14 and converting it to an advantage in re~ 
turns, a feature which tends to be high salience through the use of a 
guarantee,15 which is likely to be very high salience. This means that less-
sophisticated, fee-insensitive investors who respond more strongly to re-
turns can be induced to make a better investment choice. 
Second, the guarantee option will also likely be attractive to inves-
tors who are reluctant to shift from their status quo investments and suf-
fer from the "status quo bias. "16 These investors can maintain a virtual 
attachment to the old, while creating an option for higher return. Be-
cause the guarantee account each month shows the investor what the 
value of the old account would have been and gives the investor the 
wherewithal to reverse course and reinvest in the status quo, the guaran-
tee allows investors to frame the strategy as maintaining the old account 
but gaining an option to participate in potentially higher returns of an-
other fund. 
Finally, the guarantee may also prove attractive to investors who, in 
particular, wish to avoid picking the worst investments. Dan Ariely has 
shown in a variety of different contexts that decision makers in deciding 
between "A" and "B" will increase their likelihood of picking "A" if a 
14. James J. Choi et al., Why Does the Law of One Price Fail? An Experiment on Index Mutual 
Funds 5 (Nat'I Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12261, 2006), available at http://www. 
nber.org/papers/w12261. 
15. Andrea Frazzini & Owen A. Lamont, Dumb Money: Mutual Fund Flows and the Cross-
Section of Stock Returns, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 299, 300 (2008). 
16. Alexander Kempf & Stefan RuenzL Status Quo Bias and the Number of Alternatives: 
An Empirical Illustration from the Mutual Fund Industry, 7 J. BEHAV. FIN. 204, 211 (2006); William 
Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 
14 (1988). 
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third option, "A'," which is clearly dominated by "A," is added to the 
menu of possible choices.17 Thus, for example, a photograph of Ayres is 
more likely to be chosen as more attractive than a photograph of Curtis 
if a third option with a distorted image of Ayres is added. Subjects who 
are anxious about making a clear error can at least be sure that un-
distorted Ayres is superior to distorted Ayres. Analogously, investors 
who are trying to choose among a range of disparate and difficult to 
compare mutual funds can take comfort in knowing that the guaranteed 
fund is at least better than the fund that it targets. More sophisticated, 
fee-sensitive investors who may balk at sacrificing twenty percent of the 
upside can use the availability of the guarantee as a proxy to identify a 
low-cost, high-quality investment option. Even if these investors opt not 
to accept the guarantee, their shopping costs are lowered because the 
guarantee represents a credible signal of quality. Low-cost fund provid-
ers also benefit, because they can use the guarantee to attract new cus-
tomers who could not be lured by emphasizing only costs. Even investors 
who are unaware of the availability of a guarantee would benefit if the 
competitive pressure produced by guarantees induces high-cost funds to 
reduce their fees. 
The mutual fund industry is heavily regulated and the question of 
whether mutual fund performance guarantees are permissible turns on 
close interpretive questions of securities regulation. This Article argues 
that a performance guarantee is consistent with the policy concerns that 
motivate the current regulatory environment. The most natural imple-
mentation of a performance guarantee would be as a class of mutual fund 
shares with a fee structure that adjusts the management fees to ensure 
that the terms of the guarantee are met. Mutual fund fees that adjust 
with performance are permissible only in limited circumstances, and the 
implementation suggested here is novel. Nevertheless, as a matter of 
statutory law, a performance guarantee is not barred, nor do current reg-
ulations explicitly prevent it.18 Importantly, the rules that restrict perfor-
mance-based fees are motivated by concerns about excessive costs and 
risks that tend to mitigate in favor of permitting performance guaran-
tees.19 Given the potential benefits of a performance guarantee, both di-
rectly to investors and indirectly through enhanced competition, the SEC 
should provide a framework for funds to create performance-guaranteed 
share classes. 
The concept of a performance guarantee to alter the salience of 
prices has potential well beyond the market for mutual funds. An endem-
ic challenge for consumer protection concerns the "problem of back-end 
prices."20 At the time of contracting, consumers tend to focus on the 
17. DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR 
DECISIONS, 10-14 (rev. & expanded ed. 2009). 
18. 17 C.F.R. § 230.156 (2014). 
19. Dean L. Bussey, Securities Regulation-Performance Fees Under the Investment Advisers 
Act: The Inadequacy of Disclosure Provisions, 11 J. CORP. L. 457, 472 (1986). 
20. See Gil-Bazo & Ruiz-Verdu, supra note 3, at 2173. 
8 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2015 
front-end prices, which they pay at the time of contract, and are less like-
ly to take into account various back-end contingent charges.21 They pay 
attention to the teaser rates offered on credit cards and not to the late 
fees or even the rate to which the card will ultimately reset.22 Car renters 
pay more attention to the front-end rental price and not to the back-end 
price to refill the car.23 Cellphone users pay attention to the monthly rate 
and not to the overage fees. 24 Online comparison services such as Orbitz 
only compound the problem. These services tend to rank airlines and ho-
tels based on their front-end prices without taking into account the back-
end charges for services such as checking bags or Internet access.25 Com-
petitors who try to cut the back-end fees and compete with higher, all-
inclusive front-end prices are at competitive disadvantage. Indeed, com-
petitive pressure often leads sellers to cut front-end prices below costs 
and compensate the difference by increasing back-end prices.26 Conse-
quently, teaser pricing has become prevalent across a range of consumer 
markets.27 
This competitive front-end pricing may alleviate anticompetitive 
concerns resulting from high back-end prices. If competitors continue to 
cut teaser prices (possibly even paying consumers upfront for the right to 
extort them on the back end) until they earn zero profits, then consumers 
would, in the aggregate, be paying competitive prices for their products. 
While there is strong evidence of teaser competition in some markets,28 
there is still the possibility that back-end pricing renders markets less 
competitive. First, there is a pricing distortion that induces allocative in-
efficiency when consumers face supracompetitive prices on contingent 
services. When consumers book hotels, they may underconsume Internet 
services offered by hotels (which are usually priced above cost) and 
overconsume the number of nights stayed at hotels (when set at teaser 
rates below cost).29 Second, there are compelling reasons to support the 
claim that ex ante competition in many markets fails to reduce the com-
bined front-end and back-end price to the competitive level. When prices 
are a complex combination of front- and back-end fees, consumer confu-
sion may limit the potential for competition to reach a competitive equi-
librium over total cost. Inefficient price variation in the mutual fund in-
dustry is an example of this effect. 
21. Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749, 
769, 800 (2007); Julio J. Rotemberg, Behavioral Aspects of Price Setting, and Their Policy Implications 
33 (Nat'I Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13754, 2008), available at http://www.nber. 
org/papers/w13754. 
22. Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1373, 1392-93 (2003). 
23. Ian Ayres & Barry Nalebuff, In Praise of Honest Pricing, 45 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 24, 25 
(2003). 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 28. 
26. Id. at 26. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. See generally id. at 24 (describing the harms of hidden pricing and consumers' inability to 
figure out the actual cost of an item or service). 
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With an emphasis on the application to mutual funds, this Article 
will explicate why the law should promote improved performance guar-
antees as a mechanism to enhance market competition. Part II discusses 
why conventional arbitrage, through shorting, is difficult to implement in 
mutual funds. Part III presents the theory and evidence on the feasibility 
of performance guarantees in mutual funds to overcome obstacles to ar-
bitrage. Part IV explains the legal environment in which a guarantee 
would operate. Part V tackles a variety of policy concerns, including anti-
trust and consumer protection issues, created by the guarantees, and 
proposes that the SEC promulgate rules to facilitate the creation of a vi-
brant guarantee market. Finally, Part VI argues that guarantees can also 
be deployed to help mitigate the back-end pricing problem in a host of 
consumer markets and foster enhanced ex ante competition. 
II. BARRIERS TO MUTUAL FuND ARBITRAGE 
If mutual funds were widely traded in liquid secondary markets, so-
phisticated investors would quickly move to sell high-fee index funds 
short and use the proceeds to buy long comparable low-fee funds that 
have a higher expected return. But mutual fund regulation mandates that 
mutual fund shareholders have redemption rights at the net asset value 
("NA V") of the underlying assets.30 This means that mutual fund share-
holders who wish to leave the fund and invest elsewhere need not find a 
buyer for the shares, but need only return the shares to the fund in ex-
change for their pro rata portion of the funds' assets. The NA V redemp-
tion rights preempt the operation of secondary-market pricing.31 Shares 
of open-end mutual funds could never trade in a secondary market for 
less than their NA V because fund shareholders would sell at the higher 
NAV value.32 Because of NAV redemption rights, mutual funds with 
substantially different expected returns can be traded-purchased and 
redeemed from their respective mutual funds-at the same NAV price.33 
One hundred dollars invested in the MainStay and Vanguard index funds 
would have substantially different expected returns, but the same current 
NAY. 
NAY redemption rights thus seem to destroy the possibility of arbi-
traging differences in expected return by selling short the low-expected-
return fund and buying long the high-expected-return fund. Absent a 
secondary market in which to sell shares, short selling is impossible. But 
30. The ICA requires that shares be redeemed within seven days of tender, but most mutual 
fund redemptions occur within twenty-four hours. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(c); 
John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee Litigation Don't 
Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 102 (2010); see also 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-l(a) (2014) ("No 
registered investment company issuing any redeemable security ... shall sell, redeem, or repurchase 
any such security except at a price based on the current net asset value of such security .... "). 
31. Morely & Curtis, supra note 30, at 104--05. 
32. Similarly, buyers of shares would never purchase at higher than NA V on a secondary mar-
ket, when they could purchase new shares directly from the fund at NAV. 
33. Morley & Curtis, supra note, 30 at 103. 
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arbitrage might still be possible even without a secondary market with 
prices that deviate from NA V. If investors could easily borrow mutual 
fund shares, then they need not sell the shares in the secondary market to 
profit from arbitrage. Instead, investors with margin accounts could place 
"short redemption" orders with brokers. The brokers would obtain mu-
tual fund shares to borrow from (1) the brokerage firm's own inventory, 
(2) the account of one of the firm's clients who had granted the broker 
customer loan consent, (3) another brokerage firm, or (4) from institu-
tional investors.34 The broker executing a short-redemption would re-
deem the borrowed shares from the fund at NAV and reinvest the pro-
ceeds in an alternative investment (in the foregoing example, a 
comparable but low-fee mutual fund). The long shares purchased togeth-
er with a required margin amount would serve as collateral to assure that 
the short redeemer would have sufficient funds to repay the share loan in 
the future-and as with traditional stock shorts, the loan would be calla-
ble, if value of the security fell, triggering a margin call. 
The borrowed shares would be repaid (the short position covered) 
by the broker purchasing sufficient shares from the fund at the then 
NA V price to put the lending shareholder in the same position as she 
would have been in if she had continuously held the original shares. Just 
as short sellers of securities are required to make payments in lieu of div-
idends to the share lender if the borrowed shares pay dividends,35 the 
short redeemer would be required to ultimately pay an amount that 
would place the mutual fund lender in the same position as if she had not 
lent her shares.36 
Redeeming borrowed mutual fund shares is not a new concept. Fi-
delity and Jack White and Company both offered short-selling programs 
of open-ended mutual funds in the early 90s.37 The programs offered by 
these brokers differed from the fee-based short redemption that we pro-
pose here. Fidelity's short-selling program was designed to enable inves-
34. Regulation SHO requires a broker-dealer to have reasonable grounds to believe that the 
security can be borrowed so that it can be delivered on the date delivery is due before effecting a short 
sale order in any equity security. This "locate" must be made and documented prior to effecting the 
short sale. Division of Market Regulation: Key Points about Markey Regulation SHO, U.S. SEC (Apr. 
11, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/keyregshoissues.htm. 
35. See Publication 550, Investment Income & Expenses: (Including Capital Gains & Losses), 
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 58, available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p550.pdf ("Payments in lieu of dividends. If you borrow stock to make a short sale, you may have 
to remit to the lender payments in lieu of the dividends distributed while you maintain your short posi-
tion."). 
36. Id. at 21. 
37. Carole Gould, Mutual Funds; The Risky Business of Selling Short, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 
1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/17 /business/mutual-funds-the-risky-business-of-selling-
short. h tm 1. Fidelity and Jack White were the only brokerages to offer such services. Jim Talley, Selling 
Short Can Be Helpful in Long Run Interest in Funds on Rise as Market Climbs, ORLANDO SUN-
SENTINEL, May 18, 1992, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1992-0S-18/business/9202090138_1_individual 
-stocks-fund-short-positions. Fidelity closed its short-selling program in the aftermath of the 1987 
stock market crash. but re-opened it in 1992. Id. Fidelity's program was open only to its margin-
account brokerage customers and was not marketed publicly. Jack White & Co. offered about one 
hundred different funds in its shorting program while Fidelity offered only about twenty funds, all of-
fered by Fidelity. Id. 
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tors to bet against mutual funds that were designed to track the perfor-
mance of certain sectors of the economy.38 Thus, the bet made by the 
short seller was not based on the expenses of the fund, but on the belief 
that the sector in which the fund invested was likely to decline in value. 
The availability of the short-selling option demonstrates that mutual 
fund shares can be shorted as a practical and legal matter. 
While these mutual fund shorting programs demonstrate the legality 
of redeeming borrowed mutual fund shares as a means of selling short,39 
they are also the exception that demonstrates the structural obstacles to 
short redemption. Both the Fidelity and Jack White and Company mutu-
al fund short-selling programs have been discontinued.40 Fidelity explicit-
ly attributed the discontinuation of its short-selling programs to lack of 
demand for this type of sector-based short-selling speculation.41 We are 
not aware of any current programs that permit the short sale of open-
ended mutual fund shares (though exchange-traded funds are frequently 
sold short). The Fidelity program, in particular, illustrates the considera-
ble obstacles to fee arbitrage through borrowing shares. To understand 
these obstacles, it is helpful to discuss how fee arbitrage would work and 
how it differs from the Fidelity program. 
Fee arbitrage that may put pressure on high-cost funds is a distinct 
trading strategy from the shorting program offered through Fidelity. Fi-
delity was explicit that its shorting program was designed to allow inves-
tors to make bets about the underlying exposure of the funds' portfoli-
os.42 Fidelity also indicated that it would restrict shorting if the level of 
redemption became too high.43 Thus, Fidelity was offering a limited op-
portunity to bet against certain sectors, rather than expose its funds to 
price competition through arbitrage. 
38. Fidelity Offers Mutual Fund Short Sales, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 9, 1987, at C15. 
39. The Securities Exchange Act gives the SEC authority to regulate short sales under section 
lO(a). Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a) (2012). Regulation of short-selling mutual 
fund shares would fall under the rules for general securities short sales in Regulation SHO at 17 C.F.R. 
§ 242.200. In particular,§ 242.200(a) covers the sale of all securities, including mutual funds shares that 
are not listed on national market systems. Cf § 242.600(b)(47) (defining a NMS-national market sys-
tem-stock). 
40. See FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com (last visited Nov. 6, 2014) (providing a broad over-
view of Fidelity's offered services); TD WATERHOUSE, https://www.tdwaterhouse.ca/products-
services/investing/index.jsp (last visited Nov. 6, 2014) (providing a broad overview of TD 
Waterhouse's offered services); see also Company News; Toronto-Dominion in $100 Million Deal for 
Jack White, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/0lfbusiness/company-news-
toronto-dominion·in-100-million-deal-for-jack-white.html. 
41. Gould, supra note 37. One reason for low demand may be that the risk exposure that inves-
tors in these programs sought-to bet against a segment of the market-can now be obtained by investing 
in long-short funds that attempt to profit from the decline of overpriced stocks. See, e.g., Nadia 
Papagiannis, Protecting Your Portfolio from the Next Market Downturn, MORNINGSTAR (Sept. 24, 
2009), http://ibd.momingstar.com/article/article.asp?id=309304&CN=brf295. While not a perfect sub-
stitute for sector shorting, long-short funds have the advantage of not requiring investors to maintain a 
margin account in order to hold a position. Since these funds offer the same risk exposure with less 
complexity, demand for sector shorting may have subsided. 
42. Gould, supra note 37. 
43. See id. 
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By contrast, fee arbitrage through short redemption of high-fee 
funds targets not the funds' investments, but the funds' fee structure. The 
strategy is designed to succeed regardless of the performance of the un-
derlying portfolio of the fund. Since a short redeemer promises the share 
lender to pay the return on the high-fee fund, but invests the redemption 
proceeds in a low-fee fund, this investment has a positive expected return 
and low risk. Imagine, for example, that an investor in 2012 undertook a 
short redemption of $100 of the earlier mentioned MainStay S&P index 
and used the proceeds to invest in the comparable Vanguard index. Re-
gardless of whether or not the S&P index rose or fell, the investor should 
expect that the amount it owes on the short redemption to be sixty-four 
basis points less than the amount owned long (the difference between the 
two funds' expense ratios 0.81 % and 0.17%, respectively). The high-fee 
fund will almost certainly underperform the low-fee fund, and the inves-
tor's obligation to pay the high-fee fund's return, will therefore be more 
than offset by the returns of the low-fee fund. The primary risk is that the 
funds fail to adequately track the index, but, as we show below, this risk 
is low for a large portion of the market. 
Because it is an arbitrage opportunity, the possibility of short-
redemptions would likely create redemption runs on the most inefficient 
funds as sophisticated investors would increasingly redeem borrowed 
shares to arbitrage the fee differential. These targeted funds would see 
their assets under management dwindle and would face increasing com-
petitive pressure to reduce their fees, increase their net of fee returns, or 
be pushed by redemption from the marketplace. 
If shorting shares of high-fee index funds is legal and profitable, 
then why has the market failed to implement this arbitrage? One im-
portant consideration is that mutual fund advisors have reason to prevent 
short redemption of their own funds to the extent possible. Since mutual 
fund companies charge customers for managing funds, redemption re-
duces their income. The fee arbitrage that is beneficial to sophisticated 
investors is costly to fund managers. Consider what would have hap-
pened if Fidelity had included the Magellan fund in its menu of shortable 
funds. For many years, Magellan closely tracked the S&P 500 stock index 
while charging substantial fees. 44 This led it to predictably underperform 
low cost index funds. If Magellan shares could be borrowed and re-
deemed, it is possible that investors could have short redeemed Magellan 
and invested the proceeds in a low-cost index fund.45 Such trading activity 
would have been costly to Fidelity, since it would have reduced the assets 
under management in the Magellan fund, and therefore reduced the in-
come to Fidelity from managing the fund. Note, though, that Fidelity was 
in a position to exclude the Magellan shares from its menu of shortable 
44. Ross M. Miller, Stansky's Monster: A Critical Examination of Fidelity Magellan's "Franken-
fund," (Feb. 22, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=964824. 
45. In the next Part, we present data to demonstrate the feasibility of arbitrage of index and ac-
tively managed funds. 
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funds. While fund managers cannot prevent shareholders from redeem-
ing shares, brokers affiliated with those managers are not under an obli-
gation to lend out shares for short redemption. While Fidelity was willing 
to lend shares of sector funds to its own margin account holders to per-
mit shorting, a high-fee index fund provider would likely be less willing 
to lend out shares for redemption if such redemption would put signifi-
cant price pressure on fund fees. 
Funds with supracompetitive fees might respond to the existential 
threat posed by short redemptions by adopting back-end loads, which 
cause investors to incur costs when they redeem shares. By making re-
demption expensive, funds could further inhibit arbitrage through short 
redemption. While some investors might avoid funds with back-end 
loads, the investors most vulnerable to high-cost funds are likely insensi-
tive to back-end loads as well. As such, back-end loads might provide a 
mechanism by which high-cost funds could resist the market pressure of 
short redemption. 
The potential for short redemption can also be impeded, if only a 
few shareholders make their shares available for potential loan. As noted 
above, brokerages that create and market the funds are unlikely to be 
willing participants in a short redemption trade. Alternative sources of 
share lending may be difficult to find: While institutional shareholders 
are common lenders of stocks to short traders, intuitional investors are 
unlikely to take large positions in high-fee funds. Shares of high-fee 
funds are mostly sold to investors via full-service brokers that, them-
selves, have an incentive to ensure that the funds are not competed out 
of existence. Thus, shares of high-fee funds are disproportionately likely 
to be held in widely dispersed accounts, many of which are maintained 
by brokers that have an incentive to protect the funds from competition. 
In such an environment, borrowing shares is difficult and expensive. 
These barriers created by self-interested intermediaries may be so 
great that it may be infeasible for enlightened regulations to induce a suf-
ficient supply of lendable shares to make shorting practicably feasible. 
But, the disciplinary benefits of encouraging redemption runs on funds 
with supracompetitive fees, we feel, might be worth attempting the fol-
lowing reforms to encourage an adequate supply of lendable shares. Be-
low, we sketch out some potential reforms to increase shares available 
for borrowing, as well as the difficulties with the proposed reforms. 
While none of these reforms is likely to be a complete solution to achiev-
ing price efficiency, they may nevertheless create enough opportunity for 
arbitrage to leave investors better off. In the next Part, we discuss in ex-
tended detail an alternative proposal, improved performance guarantees, 
which may be more effective. 
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First, the SEC might promulgate rules that set lendability of shares 
as an opt-out default for mutual funds open to retail investors.46 This 
would require mutual funds to either lend shares or disclose that they re-
fused to lend shares. While some funds might have non-fee related rea-
sons for opting out, such as illiquid positions, the public nature of the 
opt-out means that there would be at least some cost to opting out. One 
challenge is that the highest-fee funds likely face lower opt-out costs, as 
investors who are insensitive to fees are unlikely to be highly attuned to 
this more abstract measure of fee excessiveness. Nevertheless, ratings 
agencies like Morningstar might take a fund's decision to opt-out into ac-
count in computing ratings that are more consumable for investors. 
A related option that would not require SEC action would be to 
leverage the fiduciary duties of mutual fund directors. Mutual fund direc-
tors are charged with negotiating management and fee arrangements 
with the fund advisors.47 Thus, the directors of Fidelity's Magellan fund 
contract with Fidelity Management and Research, LLC to operate the 
fund for an agreed upon fee. The determination of the fee agreement is 
the primary responsibility of mutual fund directors.48 Since short redemp-
tion provides a mechanism for a market check on the reasonableness of 
fees, directors might be encouraged to include, as part of the manage-
ment agreement, that brokers affiliated with the investment advisor per-
mit lending of the shares for short redemptions. Including the discussion 
of share lending as a part of the fee agreement negotiations would at 
least require investment advisors to state their rationale for not exposing 
their fee structure competition through redemption. Because such an 
agreement would be contractual, no regulatory reform would be needed 
to implement it, but mutual fund directors ought to be encouraged to in-
clude lendability of shares as one of the terms discussed when negotiat-
ing the fee agreement. Encouraging directors to negotiate for shares to 
be lent as an industry norm could enhance price discipline through arbi-
trage. 
The difficulty with this proposal is that mutual fund directors do not 
have strong incentives to challenge fund advisors.49 Directors are unlikely 
to face shareholder challenges, since shareholders who are both dissatis-
fied and sophisticated enough to participate in voting on directors will 
simply move to another fund. 50 As with the opt-out proposal, the highest-
fee funds are those least likely to have directors that would aggressively 
negotiate for share lending. After all, if these directors were effective in 
protecting investors, the funds' fees would not be egregiously high in the 
first place. 
46. The default might be usefully complimented with an "altering rule" that the SEC recom-
mends that shareholders not opt out. See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Al-
tering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 2032 (2012). 
47. Morley & Curtis, supra note 30, at 91. 
48. Id. at 94-95. 
49. Id. at 95, 135. 
50. Id. at 107--08. 
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A third option is for the law to encourage fiduciaries, such as 401(k) 
plan administrators, to insist that their brokers offer their shares for the 
lending market. Such a reform could take the form of a safe harbor for 
share lending, limiting the liability for any losses incurred as the result of 
prudent lending, or affirmative guidance that lending is part of prudent 
plan administration. As long as the loans are sufficiently low-risk, offer-
ing plan shares would provide administrators with a strong market test of 
whether they should alter their plan menus. Such a proposal would have 
the dual benefit of increasing the number of shortable shares while also 
providing a direct signal to plan advisors that their funds may be poor 
choices. If arbitrageurs are aggressively seeking to short the funds held 
by a plan, the plan should probably find new funds in which to invest. As 
with directors, this proposal could leverage the fiduciary duties of plan 
administrators to encourage this sort of market check as part of the duty 
of care. One difficulty is that high-fee funds tend to be held by the small-
est 401(k) plans,51 so the number of shares available from any particular 
plan's decision to lend may be small. 
These nudge-like interventions might not be sufficient to overcome 
the entrenched interests of high-fee funds and their intermediaries. But 
the feasibility of short sales in current ETF markets provides some sup-
port for the notion that some shareholders are currently willing to lend 
their shares.52 A corollary to the insight of this paper is that if short sell-
ing of an ETF is reasonably cost-effective, it should limit the ability of 
the ETF to charge supracompetitive rates. For example, as of 2013, it was 
feasible for retail investors to short high-volume ETFs-such as SPY, an 
S&P 500 index ETF-for less than thirty-seven basis points.53 
These thirty-seven basis points represent an approximate upper lim-
it on the amount of supracompetitive rates that an ETF could charge, if it 
had a competitive supply of shares to short. The threat of short-selling 
would likely preclude high-fee funds from offering ETF versions of their 
mutual funds, at least not with shares held in sufficient quantities by 
shareholders willing to lend into the short market.54 The experience from 
ETF shorting, in sum, is that there may be substantial benefits in man-
51. Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of Excessive Fees 
and 'Dominated Funds' in 401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2399531. 
52. One of the authors shorted an ETF through an Interactive Brokers account in January of 
2012 to demonstrate that shorting ETFs continues to be possible. 
53. Under the SEC's Regulation T, short-selling retail customers must, in addition to the cash 
collateral from the short sale, post fifty percent of the value of the short sale in additional collateral, 
although this additional collateral may be posted in Treasury Bills. On January 5, 2013, Interactive 
Brokers had 7.7 million shares of SPY for which it was willing to arrange short sales for a "rebate rate" 
of eight basis points (which is paid on all collateral values) and "fee rate" of twenty-five basis points 
(which is paid on the loan portion of collateral) implying a total cost of putting on the short of thirty-
seven basis points ( =l.5*8+25) less the return that one could earn by providing the margin equity in 
Treasury Bills. 
54. There are a few high-fee ETFs, but they can only be shorted at unfeasibly high rates. For 
example, the Guggenheim 2x S&P 500 (RSU) has expenses of 0.71 % and might be ripe for short re-
demption, but as of January 5, 2013, Interactive Brokers had just 35,000 shares to lend that it was will-
ing to offer at an effective cost (calculated analogously to the last note) of 285 basis points. 
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agement expense discipline from facilitating the potential for effective 
shorting of the worst funds. 
Stepping back, this Part has shown that a regime that enables short 
redemptions can comfortably sit on top of our current NA V redemption 
rules. Enlightened regulatory reform could (1) clarify that brokers can 
borrow mutual fund shares for purposes of producing a short redemption 
for their clients, (2) restrict the ability of issuers from contractually im-
peding such lending, and (3) create an opt-out system of presumed 
shareholder consent to lend. Just as presumed consent for cadaveric do-
nations has produced a rich supply of kidneys and other needful organs,55 
presumed consent to lend (with appropriate minimum lender protection 
terms) might help assure an abundant potential supply of mutual fund 
shares for short redemption. Creating a credible threat of short redemp-
tions is a worthy regulatory goal because it could provide powerful mar-
ket indicators that are currently absent regarding which funds are in fact 
dominated. Moreover, short redemptions are likely to place substantial 
pressure on the worst funds to reform their ways or face extinction by 
redemption. 
In the next Part, we propose an alternative to conventional mutual 
fund short selling to implement fee arbitrage. The mechanism we sug-
gest, improved performance guarantees, addresses the structural and in-
termediary obstacles to the short redemptions discussed here, while also 
sharing the benefits of the arbitrage with purchasers of the high-fee 
funds, and it addresses the behavioral biases that induce investors to pur-
chase high fee funds in the first place. 
Ill. THE SCOPE AND FEASIBILITY OF IMPROVED PERFORMANCE 
GUARANTEES REGARDING MUTUAL FuND PERFORMANCE 
The short redemptions discussed above enable arbitrage by allow-
ing sophisticated investors to redeem borrowed shares and reinvest the 
proceeds in funds with higher expected returns. But if mutual fund shares 
cannot readily be borrowed, then short redemption may be too costly to 
be profitable. That the well-known dispersion in the fees of index funds 
has not been targeted by arbitrageurs is evidence that structural obstacles 
to arbitrage by short redemption are too costly to surmount. 
In this Part, we discuss a new type of fund-fee arbitrage. Rather 
than borrow shares to redeem them, we suggest that low-cost fund man-
agers can induce investors in high-cost funds to redeem their own shares 
by offering them guaranteed improved performance in a lower cost fund. 
The benefits of this switch can be divided by the guarantee mechanism 
between the fund manager and the investor, leaving both better off. The 
improved performance strategy facilitates arbitrage instead by inducing 
less sophisticated investors to redeem their inefficient shares and to rein-
vest the proceeds in a fund with a higher expected return. Both the short 
55. See Eric Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 SCI.1338 (2003). 
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redemptions and the improved performance guarantee use guarantees to 
motivate the existing (less sophisticated) shareholder to participate in 
arbitraging transaction. The short redemption transaction has the sophis-
ticated borrowing shareholder guarantee to return future shares with 
make-whole NA V value to induce the (less sophisticated) shareholder to 
lend her shares in the targeted fund. The borrowing shareholder is will-
ing to make this guarantee as a cost of gaining the chance to arbitrage the 
difference in expected return between the redeemed shares and the rein-
vested shares. The improved performance transaction similarly has the 
sophisticated party guarantee make-whole value to assure the unsophis-
ticated shareholders that they will not lose value by redeeming the high-
fee shares. The guarantor is willing to make this guarantee as a cost of 
gaining the chance to arbitrage the difference in the expected return-
here by taking part of the upside in the expected difference in return be-
tween the targeted fund and the reinvested fund. The core motive behind 
both transactions is arbitrage, and the core inducement to the original 
(less sophisticated) shareholder is a species of make-whole guarantee. 
The advantage of a performance guarantee is that it avoids the need to 
borrow shares by targeting high-cost fund investors directly. 
In this Part, we demonstrate how improved performance guarantees 
in the mutual fund space might be structured and provide evidence that 
the guarantees can be profitably offered to consumers. The basic idea is 
simple: mutual fund advisors with a cost-advantage, like Fidelity and 
Vanguard, should create funds that are guaranteed to outperform high-
cost competitors. For example, a fund could offer to cover one-hundred 
percent of short-fall in downside relative performance for twenty percent 
of the relative performance upside. Such an arrangement would provide 
investors some security in switching funds. It would also allow low-fee 
mutual funds, like those offered by Fidelity and Vanguard, to capture a 
portion of the supracompetitive fees charged by their high-cost competi-
tors. 
Even though mutual funds' expense ratios are fully disclosed at the 
time of investment and are prominently reported in the funds' short form 
prospectuses and on websites such as Google Finance, it has proven ex-
traordinarily difficult to induce consumers to eschew high-fee funds. In 
field experiments by Choi and Laibson, Harvard employees, who were 
given $10,000 to invest among different S&P index funds and armed with 
a wealth of different disclosures concerning performance and costs, con-
sistently opted for funds with supracompetitive fees.56 The continued ex-
istence of high-fee funds is strong prima facie evidence that fee competi-
tion has not been sufficient to drive out supracompetitive pricing.57 
56. See Choi et al., supra note 14, at 2. 
57. Fee litigation has also not been successful at targeting the funds with the highest fees. Quinn 
Curtis & John Morley, An Empirical Study of Mutual Fund Excessive Fee Litigation: Do the Merits 
Matter?, 30 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 275 (2014). This is not equivalent to claiming that mutual funds are 
wholly immune from price competition. John C. Coates IV & R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the 
Mutual Fund Industry: Evidence and Implications for Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151 (2007) (showing that 
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Consider the Vanguard and MainStay funds of our motivating ex-
ample. Vanguard could off er a new class of shares of its S&P 500 index 
fund that would be guaranteed to at least match the after-fee perfor-
mance of the MainStay fund on a rolling basis.58 To investors in the 
MainStay fund, Vanguard offers the following deal: At the end of each 
month, the fees of the guarantee-class shares are calculated so that the 
returns over the preceding twelve-month period are equal to the returns 
on the nonguaranteed Vanguard share class, less twenty percent of any 
excess performance in the Vanguard fund over the previous twelve 
months. In the unlikely event that Vanguard is outperformed by the 
high-cost competitor, Vanguard's management fees would be refunded 
to make up the difference in performance. If the amount of the refund 
exceeds the management fees, then Vanguard must pay money into the 
fund. 59 An investor who buys the guarantee shares may, during the first 
month, for example, have a worse return than the benchmark fund, but if 
that investor holds the shares for a full year, then the performance is 
guaranteed to at least match the benchmark. If the investor keeps hold-
ing the shares, in every subsequent month, the guarantee will hold. Over 
any period longer than a year, investors who switch to the guarantee-
class shares will do at least as well as if they had stayed in the target fund. 
There is no need to restrict the guarantee to investors who actually 
switch from the high-cost fund to the guaranteed fund. All the guarantor 
requires is that the investor (1) invests funds in the guarantor's lower-
cost fund and (2) agrees to trade one-hundred percent for any prospec-
tive shortfall in relative performance with a specified higher-cost fund in 
return for giving up twenty percent in any relative performance upside. 
The free-standing nature of the improved performance guarantee means 
that the strategy can be deployed not only as an account acquisition 
strategy, but also as an antiattrition strategy. Investors who are thinking 
about abandoning an existing low-cost index in favor of some higher-cost 
fund might be dissuaded if they can maintain their low-cost investment 
and still participate in any potential increased performance of the other 
fund. Indeed, the guarantee is even more powerful as an antiattrition in-
centive than as an acquisition incentive. To acquire a new account, the 
low-cost fund offers eighty percent of the upside; to deter attrition, the 
low-cost fund offers to compensate for one-hundred percent of any bene-
fit the investor would have made from switching. 
One of us has argued elsewhere that the strong exit rights created 
by the mandated NAV redemption of the ICA has rendered mutual fund 
the mutual fund industry exhibits several indicia of competition). Nevertheless, there remain many 
funds with fees that are hard to justify within a framework of fully efficient price competition. 
58. Mutual funds frequently offer different share classes that hold the same portfolio but have 
different fee structures. For example, a fund might offer higher-fee shares to small investors and low-
er-fee shares in the same portfolio to institutional investors. See generally Coates & Hubbard, supra 
note 57 (discussing competition in the mutual fund industry). In this case, the guarantee shares would 
have the same index fund portfolio but would offer a fee structure that would implement the guaran-
tee. 
59. See supra Part II for a more detailed discussion of this contractual arrangement. 
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shareholder control rights superfluous.60 The powerful exit rights of NA V 
redemption enhances competition among mutual funds that have to con-
tinually meet the appetites of shareholders or face the risk that they will 
be redeemed out of existence.61 But the exit rights of NA V redemption 
have not been sufficient to ensure perfect competition in the mutual fund 
industry.62 The existence of high-fee funds with expected below-market 
returns is powerful evidence that procompetitive threats of redemption 
are not sufficient to eliminate the existence of all inefficient funds. 
A. Riskless Arbitrage of Expense Ratio Differences 
As the previous Part demonstrated, there are significant obstacles 
to selling mutual funds short in the current market, and, while modest 
regulatory reforms could improve the situation, borrowing shares of 
high-fee funds is likely to remain difficult; as a result, conventional arbi-
trage is unable to eliminate fee disparities in mutual funds. This is not to 
say that mutual fund prices are free from the pressures of the market. 
Mutual fund fees are at least partially constrained by conventional mar-
ket pressures. But as the Choi and Laibson experiment, and a host of 
other research,63 demonstrates, these competitive pressures are incom-
plete because not all investors respond rationally to information about 
fees.64 Some funds with supracompetitive fees survive.65 
Improved performance guarantees can be seen as a type of arbi-
trage trade implemented by the guarantor. While the shares of MainStay 
cannot be feasibly sold short, the bet that Vanguard will outperform 
MainStay takes a similar position; the worse MainStay does, the higher 
the value of the guarantee to Vanguard. Since, as we shall see, this will 
almost certainly happen, the trade is an attractive one for the guarantor. 
But what about the counterparty, the individual investor? If Vanguard is 
the winner, must the customer lose? If the trade took the form of a sim-
ple bet that Vanguard would outperform MainStay, then the answer 
would be yes, but the guarantee is more nuanced. Here, Vanguard asks 
for only twenty percent of the outperformance, leaving the rest for the 
investor. Vanguard is effectively splitting the winnings of the arbitrage 
trade with the investor counterparty. Whether giving up this twenty per-
cent relative to the nonguaranteed shares is worth it depends on the in-
vestor, but there is clearly at least one group of investors who are unam-
biguously better off: holders of the MainStay index fund. They cannot be 
worse off and will almost certainly be better off if they make the switch. 
60. See generally, Morley & Curtis, supra note 30. 
61. See id. at 10~. 
62. See id. at 131. 
63. Brad M. Barber et al., Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Effects of Expenses on Mutual Fund 
Flows, 78 J. Bus. 2095, 2114-15 (2005); Choi et al., supra note 14, at 5; Wilfred L. Dellva & Gerard T. 
Olson, The Relationship Between Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses and Their Effects on Performance, 
33 FIN. REV. 85, 100--01 (1998); Gil-Bazo & Ruiz-Verda, supra note 3, at 2179. 
64. See Barber et al., supra note 63, at 2114. 
65. See id. at 2117. 
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The guarantee can be understood as an arbitrage trade in which the sur-
plus of the trade is divided with the customer in such a way as to leave 
both the guarantor and investors better off. 
There is some debate over whether index funds with different fees 
reflect a failure of price competition and the law of one price, or if they 
simply reflect that some mutual fund companies are more full-service 
than others.66 Since ancillary services are hard to observe, this debate is 
difficult to settle empirically. But performance guarantees may provide a 
means of settling the question in the marketplace. If investors in the 
MainStay fund are happy to pay higher fees in exchange for purportedly 
better service, then the guarantee should attract few customers. 
Making price more salient through a guarantee would not alter the 
decision for investors who are already responding rationally to price. But 
if these investors are making a mistake because price is insufficiently sa-
lient, then the guarantee should induce them to switch. The guarantee 
therefore provides a market-oriented alternative to fee litigation or fee 
regulation to disentangle high costs from ancillary services. 
B. An Analysis of Guarantee Risk and Reward: An Example 
We now turn to the empirical question of whether guarantees are 
financially viable. The cleanest application of improved performance 
guarantees concerns, as in our motivating example, a low-cost index 
guaranteeing improved performance in comparison to a high-cost fund 
tracking the same index. At least in theory, index-specific guarantees 
represent a mechanism to arbitrage the expense ratio differential without 
risk.67 Each index fund should yield a return exactly equal to the differ-
ence between its return and that fund's expenses.68 Consequently, the 
lower-cost index return would never be lower than that of the higher-cost 
index. The guarantee could be offered without risk, and the lower-cost 
fund would just earn a portion of each period's expense ratio differential, 
which would be identical to the return differential of the two funds. 
In practice, however, index-specific guarantees are not riskless. In-
dex funds that economize on transaction costs typically only strive to 
track an index by investing in a representative subset of the index 
stocks.69 An index-specific guarantor, bearing the risk of error when 
tracking one or both funds, might drive the return of the higher-cost fund 
above that of the lower-cost fund. Vanguard claims that a well-run S&P 
66. Sean Collins, Are S&P 500 Index Funds Commodities?, INVESTMENT COMPANY INST. 
PERSPECTIVE, Aug. 2005, at 1, 1. 
67. Marnia Badkar,Jack Bogle: An Elegantly Simple Formula Shows Why Passive Investing Will 
Earn Higher Returns than Active Investing, Bus. INSIDER (Aug. 26, 2013, 9:49 PM), http://www. 
businessinsider.com/bogle-elegantly-simple-fonnula-for-passive-investing-2013-8. 
68. Index Fund Management, ETF.COM (July 1, 2002), http://www.etf.com/publications/journalof 
indexes/joi-articles/1412.html?showall=&fullart=l&start=S. 
69. See Mitch Tuchman, What is an Index Fund? Investing Basics, FORBES.COM (July 12, 2013, 
3:08 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mitchelltuchman/2013/07 /12/what-is-an-index-fund-investing-
basics/. 
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500 index fund should have a tracking error of five basis points or less,70 
but a Morningstar survey found an average annual tracking error of thir-
ty-eight basis points across all index funds. 71 A competitor fund might al-
so reduce its expenses or refund part of its management fees. 72 In addi-
tion, a guarantor would bear the risk that the competitor fund would, 
after the guarantee was in place, alter its investment strategy (notwith-
standing being self-characterized as an index). Thus, index-specific guar-
antors would bear tracking-error risk, fee risk, and style-drift risk.73 
Because of these risks, it is an empirical question whether an index-
specific guarantee can be profitably offered. In this Section, we address 
this question. We begin our empirical analysis by returning to the forego-
ing example of Vanguard guaranteeing that its S&P 500 Index's perfor-
mance is superior to that of the MainStay index over any one-year histor-
ical period. Utilizing historical data, we calculate the relative 
performance difference between the two funds for each year-long period 
beginning at the first of each month over ten years, ranging 2001-2011.74 
Figure 1 shows the histogram of the relative performance for these 120 
investment periods. 
70. Anne Tergesen & Lauren Young, Index Funds Aren't All Equal, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 18, 2004), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2004-04-18/index-funds-arent-
all-equal. 
71. Id. 
72. Susan E.K. Christoffersen, Why Do Money Fund Managers Voluntarily Waive Their Fees?, 
56 J. FIN. 1117, 1118 (2001). 
73. Guarantors might also bear the risk that the competitor fund would reduce its cost once the 
guarantee was in place. Below we will discuss ways that guarantors can limit their exposure to such 
risks. See infra Parts III.A, 111.B (discussing early guarantor termination of guarantee). 
74. Data for these and other calculations is taken from the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free Mutual 
Fund Database. 
22 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2015 
FIGURE 1: COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE OF VANGUARD AND 
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Vangaurd Return Excess Over Mainstay Return 
One sees immediately that in none of the 120 year-long investment 
periods did the MainStay index produce a higher (net) return than the 
Vanguard index. Thus, during this historical period, Vanguard would 
never have had to pay off on an improved performance guarantee, if it 
had offered one against the MainStay fund. The worst that VFINX ever 
did during the sample period was still an outperformance of 0.24%. Fig-
ure 1, however, also shows variation in relative performance. The aver-
age excess performance was 0.57% (which unsurprisingly is close to 
Vanguard's expense advantage of 0.64% with a standard deviation of 
0.21 %. The variability of expected return suggests some risk that Main-
Stay's return would exceed Vanguard's in a particular year. Conserva-
tively assuming that the relative returns are normally distributed with the 
historical mean and standard deviation,75 we estimate that the chance of 
ever having to pay out on. the guarantee is incredibly small.76 Based on 
75. The normal distribution is conservative because Figure 1 shows that historical returns are 
right skewed suggesting that large negative relative returns are less likely than large positive relative 
returns. 
76. A more formal way to analyze the expected cost and benefit of an improved performance 
guarantee would be to use the Fischer-Margrabe option pricing formula. A Margrabe option is the 
option to exchange one risky asset for another. Instead of having a fixed exercise price, the exercise 
price of a Margrabe option fluctuates across time. In the Appendix, we illustrate how applying the 
Margrabe formula to the foregoing Vanguard/Mainstay guarantee yields similar results. This modifica-
tion of the Black-Scholes option pricing formula was independently developed in 1978 by Stanley 
Fischer and William Margrabe. See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Cor-
porate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637, 645-53 (1973); see, e.g., Stanley Fischer, Call Option Pricing 
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the historical distribution of returns, the chance of a negative return in a 
given year is only 0.4 % . 
The estimated cost of the guarantee in instances where the guaran-
tee must be paid is 0.03 basis points. In contrast, we estimate that the ex-
pected benefit to the guarantor of the improved performance guarantee 
when the guaranteed performance is delivered is 11 basis points, which is 
approximately equal to the mean excess performance multiplied by the 
upside percentage (0.56%*0.2%). These estimates suggest that a Main-
Stay guarantee would be highly profitable for Vanguard. It would raise 
its effective compensation from 0.18% on its unguaranteed index invest-
ments to 0.29%, which is a 64% increase in Vanguard's expected expense 
ratio on guaranteed investments. The percentage impact on Vanguard's 
expected profit would be even more dramatic. For example, if Van-
guard's profit margin on unguaranteed index investments is 2 basis 
points, the expected markup on guaranteed investments would be 450% 
larger. 
The substantial profitability of the guarantee as a standalone con-
tract- trading one-hundred percent of the downside in relative perfor-
mance in exchange for twenty percent of the upside in relative perfor-
mance-suggests that less favorable trades to the guarantor would 
remain profitable. For example, the probability of negative relative re-
turns is so small that Vanguard (or any independent guarantor) could of-
fer to pay two-hundred percent or three-hundred percent of any shortfall 
in returns without appreciably changing the expected profitability of the 
guarantee.77 Alternatively, sticking with guaranteeing a one-hundred per-
cent of downside risk, Vanguard can take just five percent or ten percent 
of the upside relative returns and still remain profitable.78 
These numbers make a strong prima facie case for the feasibility of 
improved performance guarantees and illustrate how the guarantees en-
able a low-cost fund to arbitrage the fee differential and substantially in-
crease its expected expense ratio compensation on the guaranteed fund. 
The MainStay index is an extreme example because (putting aside 12b-l 
fees which we address below) it had one of the highest expense ratios of 
any S&P index fund during the time period we examined.79 But a similar 
analysis of other S&P 500 index funds shows that guarantees could be 
profitably offered to a significant portion of the market segment.80 
When the Exercise Price Is Uncertain, and the.Valuation of Index Bonds, 33 J. FIN. 169, 173 n.8 (1978); 
William Margrabe, The Value of an Option to Exchange One Asset for Another, 33 J. FIN. 177, 180-86 
(1978). 
77. We estimate that guaranteeing three-hundred percent of downside risk instead of one-
hundred percent would reduce expected profitability of the guarantee from 11.2 to 11.1 basis points. 
78. Guaranteeing 100% of downside risk and taking 5% of upside would produce expected 
guarantor profits of 2. 7 basis points. 
79. Abby Rogers et al., Exposed: 36 Popular Index Mutual Funds that Are More Expensive than 
Vanguard's, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 15, 2012, 7:15 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/35-index-
mutual-funds-2012-5?op=l. 
80. See Equity Indexed Universal Life, WEALTH PRESERVATION INST. (2006), available at 
http://www.thewpi.org/pdf/eiul.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). 
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Suppose that Vanguard were to implement a guarantee share class 
for every S&P 500 index fund with an expense ratio higher than the first 
decile. These funds comprise more than $170 billion of total assets as of 
the end of our sample period. Were Vanguard to extend such an offer, it 
would form a portfolio of guarantees as customers opted into the guaran-
tee-class shares. The exact composition of this portfolio is difficult to 
predict, as it would depend on the actual customer response, but it is rea-
sonable to assume that customers would opt-in to the guarantee shares in 
approximate proportion to the size of the funds targeted by guarantees. 
The average payoff on this portfolio over the ten-year window from 
2001 to 2011 is 0.064%, which is smaller than the MainStay guarantee, 
but still a substantial percentage of the Vanguard index fund's fees. The 
portfolio is also higher risk. While the MainStay fund never outper-
formed the Vanguard fund, there are five months during the ten-year pe-
riod in which Vanguard would have lost money on the guarantee, with a 
mean payout of 0.018% in those months. The distribution of payouts has 
a negative skew, suggesting that large negative payouts (profits) are 
more likely than large positive payouts. The less favorable risk profile for 
this guarantee is, of course, a function of the large portion of the market 
to which the guarantee is extended. That eighty-five percent of S&P in-
dex fund assets, totaling more than $172 billion, can be profitably guar-
anteed leaves substantial room for more conservative guarantees that 
cover less of the market. Life-cycle target date funds which currently 
have invested more than $500 billion offer another opportunity for some-
thing close to riskless arbitrage.81 These funds, which mechanistically shift 
from equity to stock, have an average expense ratio of sixty-four basis 
points while Vanguard charges seventeen basis points. 
C. Guaranteeing a Diversified Portfolio of Actively Managed Funds 
The foregoing analysis focuses on passively managed index funds, 
where the main source of risk is tracking error.82 While index funds ac-
count for a growing portion of the mutual fund market, actively managed 
funds still account for nearly ninety percent of assets held in mutual 
funds.83 A potentially much broader application of guarantees would be 
to target actively managed funds as well. Guaranteeing that an index 
would outperform an individual actively managed fund would be more 
risky than targeting an index fund, because, while index funds target a 
known basket of stocks, there is a chance that the actively managed fund 
would choose winners that year. Managerial skill or luck in stock selec-
81. See Josh Carlson et al., Target-Date Series Research Paper: 2013 Survey, MORNINGSTAR 
(2013) available at http:/lcorporate.momingstar.com/US/documents/ResearchPapers/2013Target 
Date.pdf. 
82. See Brandon Thomas et al., A Tracking Error Primer, ENVESTNET PMC (Dec. 2013), availa-
ble at http:/lwww.envestnet.com/sites/default/files/documents/A %20Tracking%20Error%20Primer% 
20-%20White%20Paper.pdf. 
83. See INV. Co. INST., 2012 ICI INVESTMENT COMPANY FACTBOOK 34, 73-74 (52nd ed. 2012), 
available at http:/lwww.ici.org/pdfl2012_factbook.pdf. 
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tion is, therefore, an additional source of guarantee risk. But if that risk 
proves tolerable, guarantees with respect to actively managed funds may 
open a vast new area of the market to arbitrage via performance guaran-
tees. Moreover, the ability to offer a portfolio of guarantees across a 
group of higher-cost mutual funds would allow a guarantor to diversify 
and reduce portfolio risk in much the same way as an insurer, by holding 
a portfolio of policies, diversifies the risk of loss. 
Consider whether Vanguard could guarantee that its S&P 500 index 
fund would outperform an actively managed large-cap equity fund. 
Guaranteeing outperformance of a single actively managed fund would 
be quite risky, but the picture looks very different if Vanguard considers 
making guarantees on a group of high-cost funds. There is a wealth of in-
formation suggesting that index funds on average tend to beat actively 
managed funds.84 While Vanguard might not want to guarantee that its 
index fund will outperform a single high-cost competitor, it becomes a 
safer bet that its index will outperform most of its high-cost, actively 
managed competitors. The key is to form a diversified portfolio of guar-
antees over appropriately selected actively managed funds. 
Empirical research in mutual fund performance suggests several po-
tential factors that could be used to predict poor performance relative to 
an index fund. 85 High-fee funds are likely to underperform,86 and funds 
with poor performance in a given year are likely to have poor perfor-
mance in subsequent years.87 To demonstrate the empirical profitability 
of guarantee portfolios with respect to actively managed funds, we form 
a portfolio of guarantees for funds with high fees and persistent under-
performance. Because of the high variance of actively managed returns, 
it would be difficult to extend a profitable guarantee by taking only twen-
ty percent of the upside. For the actively managed segment of funds, we 
analyze a version of the guarantee in which Vanguard takes fifty percent 
of the upside. This higher take is necessary to compensate for the volatil-
ity of actively managed benchmarks. Of course, investors who elect the 
guaranteed funds are still better off than if they chose the fund that is a 
target of the guarantee, and the credible signal of the guarantee may in-
duce investors to opt for the nonguaranteed share class to avoid paying 
fifty percent of the upside. 
84. See Mark M. Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57 (1997); 
Mark Grinblatt & Sheridan Titman, The Persistence of Mutual Fund Performance, 47 J. FIN. 1977 
(1992); Martin J. Gruber, Another Puzzle: The Growth in Actively Managed Mutual Funds, 51 J. FIN. 
783 (1996); Burton G. Malkiel, Returns from Investing in Equity Mutual Funds 1971to1991, 50 J. FIN. 
549 (1995). 
85. Mandi Woodruff, It's Getting Harder and Harder to Deny the Power of the Index Fund, Bus. 
INSIDER (June 25, 2013, 10:25 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/index-funds-beat-actively-
managed-funds-2013-6. 
86. Gil-Bazo & Ruiz-Verdu, supra note 3, at 2183. 
87. Stephen J. Brown & William N. Goetzmann, Performance Persistence, 50 J. FIN. 679, 686 
(1995); Carhart, supra note 84, at 58; Edwin J. Elton et al., The Persistence of Risk-Adjusted Mutual 
Fund Performance 11 (NYU Working Paper No. FIN-95-018, 1995), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1298325. 
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To demonstrate the feasibility of forming a viable guarantee-
portfolio for actively managed funds, we start by sorting funds by their 
expense ratio, limiting the guarantee to funds that are in the highest 
twenty percent by expense. Among these, we select funds that show par-
ticularly poor performance as measured by risk-adjusted returns com-
puted through 2007. Risk-adjusted returns are a standard measure of 
performance in the mutual fund literature and capture the return a fund 
delivers to investors after normalizing for the fund's propensity to make 
risky bets.88 The guarantee portfolio is limited to funds with risk-adjusted 
return in the bottom twenty percent of all funds. Since historical returns 
through 2007 are used in determining which funds ought to be part of the 
guarantee portfolio, the payoff on the portfolio is calculated using data 
after 2007. This ensures that the guarantee portfolio reflects the type of 
analysis that the guarantor might have undertaken with information 
available at the time the portfolio was formed. 
The guarantee portfolio covers 9.1 % of large-cap equity funds and 
9.7% of assets held in large-cap equity funds as of the end of 2011. The 
total balance of guaranteed funds as of the end of the period is $37.9 bil-
lion. Such a guarantee would have been historically profitable. The pay-
off on the guarantee portfolio after 2008 averages 0.55% of total balance 
of guaranteed funds, but this high average payoff comes with substantial 
risk as the standard deviation of the payoff is 4%. More than a third of 
guarantee periods would have required a payout, with an average payout 
of 5.1 %. This is substantially risker than the index guarantees discussed 
above, but the average payoff is nevertheless positive. The simple selec-
tion criteria and short sample period for the foregoing example mean 
that the results are not conclusive, but the foregoing suggests that, while 
challenging and risky, guarantees with respect to actively managed mu-
tual funds are a plausible option. 
It is notable that the total size of funds subject to guarantee for the 
index fund market segment is substantially larger than the total assets in 
actively managed large cap funds that could be guaranteed, even though 
large cap funds hold more total assets. This occurs because the relatively 
precise correlation of returns in index funds eliminates much of the vari-
ability between funds, making fees a more robust predictor of relative 
performance for index funds. 
D. Guaranteeing 401 (k) Plans and Hedge Funds 
We have separately argued that a substantial number of 401(k) re-
tirement plans have supracompetitive fees. 89 Besides guaranteeing im-
proved performance of particular funds, it might be feasible for a 401(k) 
88. See Morningstar Investing Glossary: Risk-Adjusted Return, MORNINGSTAR, http://www. 
momingstar.com/InvGlossary/risk-adjusted-retum.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). 
89. Quinn Curtis & Ian Ayres, Measuring Fiduciary and Investor Losses in 401(k) Plans 24 (7th 
Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, July 15, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2107796. 
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fund provider to guarantee improved relative performance at the 401(k) 
plan level if the plan administrator would agree to offer a substitute 
menu of funds. The guarantee might say that the net returns of a plan's 
participants as a whole will increase relative to what they would have 
earned if participants had continued to invest in incumbent menu funds 
with existing fund proportions. The risk that the individual participants 
would radically change their investment strategy at the moment of rollo-
ver might be mitigated by having the guarantor create default analogs to 
the type of funds that the participant had previously chosen. The guaran-
tor might even guarantee improved relative return to individual partici-
pants as long as they make analogous menu investment choices. It would 
be difficult for a fiduciary to justify keeping a plan tied to a menu of op-
tions that was guaranteed to produce inferior returns.90 
It might also be possible to use improved performance guarantees 
to provide better transparency about whether particular hedge funds are 
worth typical annual fees of two percent base fee plus twenty percent of 
any positive returns. There are over 10,000 hedge funds and it is difficult 
for investors (such as small college endowments) to identify those whose 
net risk-adjusted returns are likely to persistently meet or beat the mar-
ket.91 Giving other funds (including other hedge funds) the ability to 
guarantee improved returns might aid institutional investors in identify-
ing poor quality funds, which are so unlikely to outperform the market 
that they fail the guarantee test. 
IV. THE LEGAL AND POLICY CASE FOR IMPROVED PERFORMANCE 
GUARANTEES 
The mutual fund industry is tightly regulated. This Part turns to the 
question of whether a performance guarantee can be implemented with-
in the current regulatory framework, or whether statutory changes or 
changes to administrative rules would be required. 
In its simplest expression, a performance guarantee is an adjustment 
to a fund's returns that ensures that the fund always returns more than 
the fund against which the guarantee is benchmarked. One way to im-
plement the guarantee would be to create a specialized mutual fund 
share class that exhibited these performance characteristics. Mutual fund 
performance is a function of two variables: the return on the assets in the 
mutual fund's portfolio and the mutual fund's fees. 92 Since mutual fund 
90. A fiduciary might respond that the advisor providing the existing menu provided other ser· 
vices-such as educating participants to enhance participation or make better investment decisions-
that might justify the guaranteed lower returns. But in a separate paper, we have shown that plans 
with higher fees tend to produce lower participation rates, contributions, and more poorly allocated 
portfolios. Ayres & Curtis, supra note 51, at 18. 
91. Press Release, Hedge Fund Research, Inc., Hedge Funds Extend Record Asset Total for 
Fourth Consecutive Quarter (July 18, 2013), available at https://www.hedgefundresearch.com/pdf/ 
pr_20130718.pdf; see also Nicole M. Boyson, Hedge Fund Performance Persistence: A New Approach, 
64 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 27 (2008). 
92. See, e.g., Morley & Curtis, supra note 30, at 103. 
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shares are issued and redeemed at the current NAY of the fund's portfo-
lio,93 direct manipulation of the portfolio return is not possible. The only 
means by which a mutual fund complex could adjust returns to imple-
ment the guarantee is through management fees. This Part shows how to 
implement the improved performance guarantee through a fund's fee 
structure and discusses the legality of doing so. 
Consider the Vanguard S&P 500 index fund discussed earlier. Sup-
pose that Vanguard were to offer a class of shares of the fund guaranteed 
to outperform the MainStay benchmark. They could be marketed as 
"Guarantee Class Shares (MainStay)," and these shares would include 
the following guarantee: 
Guarantee Class Shares are contractually committed to outper-
forming the MainStay S&P 500 index fund on an after-fee basis. 
Each month, we will compute the returns of the Vanguard S&P 500 
index portfolio and the MainStay S&P 500 index fund over the pre-
vious twelve-month period, including the effect of the MainStay 
fund's fees and a base management fee of 0.18%94 on the Vanguard 
shares. In months when the performance of the Vanguard fund, less 
the base fee, is higher over the preceding twelve-month period, you 
will be charged an additional twenty percent of the amount by 
which the Vanguard fund has outperformed the MainStay fund. In 
months when the performance of the Vanguard portfolio, less man-
agement fees, is lower than the MainStay fund, we will equalize the 
annual performance between the two funds. If the difference in re-
turns is less than the base fee, then this adjustment will be achieved 
by reducing the base fee until returns are equalized. If the differ-
ence exceeds this amount, then Vanguard will reduce the manage-
ment fee to zero and increase the balance of the portfolio by con-
tributing Vanguard capital to the fund until returns are equalized. 
Such a fee structure would ensure that any investor who bought and held 
shares of the fund for at least twelve months would do at least as well as 
if she had held MainStay S&P 500 index fund shares. The guaranteed 
performance comes at a cost of twenty percent of the upside. This fee 
structure, then, offers investors an improved performance guarantee. 
Is it legal? Answering this question involves delving into the regula-
tion of mutual funds. Legally, each mutual fund in a fund complex is a 
separate entity.95 That is, every Fidelity fund has its own separate corpo-
rate existence and its own board. 96 But mutual funds are just pools of as-
sets, lacking employees, office space, or any other operational capabili-
ties. To operate, each Fidelity mutual fund, under the direction of its 
board, contracts with Fidelity for the service of managing its assets, and 
for this service it pays Fidelity a fee. 97 Speaking in the language of in-
93. Id. at 89. 
94. Recall that this is the fee of the nonguaranteed VFINX shares of the Vanguard S&P 500 In-
dex Fund. See supra Part 111.B. 
95. See Morley & Curtis, supra note 30, at 92. 
96. See id. 
97. Seeid. 
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vestment management regulation, each fund is an investment company98 
and Fidelity is the investment advisor.99 Since mutual funds are just pools 
of assets, they take their identity in the consumer consciousness from 
their investment advisors. 
The performance guarantee fee structure suggested above would 
therefore be a contract between the corporate entity of the Vanguard 
S&P 500 index fund and Vanguard, the investment advisor. The contract 
would adjust the fee based on the relative performance of the fund. Per-
haps surprisingly, the law takes a skeptical view of performance-based 
compensation for investment advisors. Under the Investment Advisors 
Act of 1940 ("IAA"), investment advisors are barred, as a general mat-
ter, from contracting for performance-based compensation.100 This bar is 
subject to an exception for so-called fulcrum fees. 101 Fulcrum fees are de-
scribed in the IAA as: 
[C]ompensation based on the asset value of the company or fund 
under management averaged over a specified period and increasing 
and decreasing proportionately with the investment performance of 
the company or fund over a specified period in relation to the in-
vestment record of an appropriate index of securities prices or such 
other measure of investment performance as the Commission by 
rule, regulation, or order may specify[.]102 
A fulcrum fee consists of a base-level fee, which is the fee charged if the 
fund just matches the benchmark, with performance-based adjustments 
that are symmetric about the base fee as determined with reference to a 
benchmark index.103 Thus, a fund might charge a one percent fee, plus 
(minus) ten percent of the amount by which it exceeds (falls short of) a 
benchmark index. The critical statutory requirements are that the fee in-
crease or decrease proportionately, that is the manager has to have the 
same upside and downside, and that an "appropriate index" be used. 104 
The typical hedge fund arrangement of two percent base fee plus twenty 
percent of any positive returns would not be permissible: it is not bench-
marked to an index, and the fees are not reduced in the case of underper-
formance. In practice, fulcrum fees are rarely used.105 
The fulcrum fee has significant similarity to the performance guar-
antee fee structure above. The guarantee features a base fee level of 
0.18% and upward and downward performance-based adjustments of 
20% and 100% respectively. But there are several differences as well. 
The performance guarantee is not symmetric, though the asymmetry 
runs in the shareholders' favor. The performance guarantee is not 
98. See id. 
99. See id. 
100. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80-5 (2012). 
101. Id.§ 80b-5(b)(2). 
102. Id. 
103. Edwin J. Elton et al., Incentive Fees and Mutual Funds, 58 J. FIN. 779, 781 (2003). 
104. 15 u.s.c. § 80b-5(b)(2). 
105. Elton, supra note 103, at 780 ("Incentive fees are not widely used by the mutual fund indus-
try."). 
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benchmarked by an index of securities; the benchmark is a specific mu-
tual fund. The performance guarantee also differs from previously ap-
proved fulcrum fees in that adjustment for underperformance is one-
hundred percent of the difference, and this adjustment could exceed the 
level of the base fee, meaning that the advisor may have to pay out its 
own capital to the fund. It is clear that the performance guarantee fee 
would be on new legal territory, but SEC no-action letters provide some 
guidance. 
The first issue is the use of an asymmetric adjustment: twenty per-
cent of upside and one-hundred percent of the downside. From investors' 
standpoint, such an arrangement is better than the usual symmetric ad-
justment, since they would receive more in the case of underperformance 
than they give up in the case of overperformance. The asymmetry itself 
seems not to be a problem. The SEC, in a no-action letter, has explicitly 
permitted a fee arrangement that was asymmetric.106 In that case, the 
SEC issued a no-action letter with respect .to a management fee that 
would decrease twice as fast as it increased relative to an S&P 500 
benchmark.107 
The fate of a performance guarantee fee structure is not so clear, 
though. The SEC has objected to a particular class of asymmetric per-
formance-based fees taking the form of a fee refund. In a staff release, 
the SEC stated that it views fees contingent on exceeding a certain per-
formance benchmark as violating the IAA proscription on performance 
fees. 108 The staff wrote that the IAA "generally prohibits an investment 
adviser from being a party to any advisory contract which provides that 
advisory fees will be waived or refunded, in whole or in part, if a client's 
account does not meet a specified level of performance .... "109 The staff 
cited concerns about excessive risk-taking as a concern with such a prac-
tice.110 If a fund's returns are below the threshold for which it is entitled 
to compensation, then the fund's advisor might choose a highly risk port-
folio in an attempt to generate returns that would exceed the benchmark, 
knowing that if the bet did not payoff, it would receive no fees in any 
case.111 
The performance guarantee fee structure has features of both an 
asymmetric fulcrum fee and a contingent fee. Like an SEC-dispreferred 
contingent fee, a performance guarantee fee will potentially result in no 
management fee being collected by the advisor.112 This would occur if the 
guarantee shares underperformed the benchmark by more than the base 
fee. But the contingent fee arrangement described above is also similar 
106. Royce Value Trust, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 67503 (Dec. 22, 1986). 
107. Id. 
108. Contingent Advisory Compensation Arrangements, Exchange Act Release No. 721, 1980 




112. See id. 
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to the asymmetric fee that the SEC has approved.113 The permissibility of 
a performance guarantee fee may tum on the policy motivations of the 
proscription of performance-based compensation further discussed be-
low. 
Three other aspects of the performance guarantee fee structure 
warrant discussion. First, even if the performance guarantee fee is a per-
missible fulcrum fee, can a single fund be used as a benchmark? This 
question is novel. The IAA requires that funds use an "appropriate index 
of securities prices or such other measure of investment performance as 
the Commission by rule, regulation, or order may specify. "114 SEC discus-
sion of benchmarks has focused on the selection of an appropriate index, 
that is, one that closely benchmarks the fund's investing style.115 For ex-
ample, it would be impermissible for an equities fund to select the Con-
sumer Price Index ("CPI") as a benchmark, since equities typically offer 
higher returns than the increase in the CPI.116 The SEC has emphasized 
that the index ought to be similar in construction to the investing style of 
the fund in question.117 
These restrictions reflect a policy concern that use of a benchmark 
index with lower expected returns than the fund's investing style would 
lead to a scenario in which investors would regularly pay more than the 
base fee due to the appropriate index.118 This could potentially allow 
funds to effectively charge more than the stated base fee while conceal-
ing the additional expense as a performance incentive that the advisor 
was almost certain to earn. 119 While this is a sensible concern in general, 
the notion that the benchmark must approximate the expected return of 
the fund is problematic for the performance guarantee fee structure. It is 
precisely the fact that the Vanguard fund is overwhelmingly likely to 
outperform MainStay that makes a guarantee possible. The guarantee 
relies, in a sense, on an inappropriate benchmark. 
A second novel feature of the performance guarantee is that the 
amount of the downward fee adjustment may exceed the base fee, mean-
ing that the fund advisor may have to pay money into the fund. Whether 
such an arrangement is permissible has not been established. One SEC 
no-action letter suggested that such an arrangement is not allowed: 
"[F]ulcrum fee contracts do not subject advisers' capital to risk. It is only 
the advisers' fees that are subject to risk, and then only to the degree that 
113. See id. 
114. Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b)(2) (2012). 
115. See Factors to be Considered in Connection with Investment Company Advisory Contracts 
Containing Incentive Arrangements, Release No. 315, 1972 WL 125497 (Apr. 6, 1972) (hereinafter 
Factors to be Considered]. 
116. James R. Waters, SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL 498690 (June 1, 1995). 
117. See Factors to be Considered, supra note 115; see also, Mexico Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, 
1975 WL 8955 (Feb 12, 1975) (declining to permit a fund of low-growth securities to track an index of 
high-growth securities). 
118. See sources cited supra note 117. 
119. See Factors to be Considered, supra note 115. 
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they are also subject to increase."120 But in a speech to independent mu-
tual fund directors, a member of the SEC staff suggested the opposite: 
"fllt must be clear to you and the adviser what the fulcrum fee repre-
sents, including that the adviser, in addition to incurring a decline or 
elimination of its fee, may owe the fund money under certain condi-
tions. "121 This suggests that fee arrangements in which the downward ad-
justment exceeds the base fee are, at least in the view of one staffer, po-
tentially allowable, though the outcome of a no-action request is far from 
clear.122 
Lastly, the possibility that the fund advisor (in making good on the 
guarantee) might have to pay money into particular guaranteed share 
classes might cause the arrangement to run afoul of section 18(f) of the 
IAA and the associated SEC Rule 18f-3.123 Section 18(f) prohibits open-
end investment companies from issuing "senior securities."124 Rule 18f-3 
provides a limited exemption to that provision that allows the issuance of 
multiple share classes that allows limited differences between share clas-
ses with regard to their fees and voting rights.125 While differential ful-
crum fees across share classes are unproblematic, Rule 18f-3 might pro-
hibit the proceeds of the guarantee payment from being taken 
exclusively by the guarantee share class in scenarios where the payoff ex-
ceeds the base fee, since that would effectively give the guarantee share 
class priority in payment with respect to certain assets.126 This would oc-
cur only in the very unusual circumstance that the guarantee paid off in 
excess of the base fee of the guaranteed fund, but it is a possibility. 
Guarantors could avoid the potential problem of 18f-3 by issuing the 
guarantee shares as separate funds and not merely as separate share clas-
ses-but doing so would necessitate a great deal of duplicative adminis-
trative and legal expense. Another alternative might be to cap the guar-
antee payout at the level of base expenses, which would reduce the value 
of the guarantee to investors by a small amount, but avoid the regulatory 
issue. Finally, seeking regulatory reform of this provision could, of 
course, eliminate the problem. 
The foregoing discussion points to legal complexity of fitting the 
performance guarantee fee arrangement within the existing legal frame-
work for fulcrum fees and the prohibition on issuance of senior securi-
ties. It is notable, though, that as a matter of policy, improved perfor-
120. First Horizons Unlimited Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 51940 (Jan. 4, 1985). 
121. Andrew J. Donohue, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n., Speech by SEC 
Staff: Keynote Address at the Independent Directors Council Investment Company Directors Confer-
ence (Nov. 12, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch111209ajd.htm. 
122. See id. 
123. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18-18(f) {2012); 17 C.F.R. § 270.18f-3 
{2014). 
124. 15 U.S.C. § 20a-18{f)(l). 
125. 17 C.F.R. § 270.18f-3. 
126. 17 C.F.R. § 270.18f-3{c). Other readings of the rule, however, are possible. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 270.18f-3(a){l)(i) allows each class to "have a different arrangement for shareholder services or the 
distribution of securities" and 17 C.F.R. 270.18f-3(a){l){iii) allows each class to"pay a different adviso-
ry fee to the extent ... [of] different investment performance of each class." 
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mance guarantees do not implicate the concerns that motivated the pas-
sage of section 18f. Congress was concerned that senior securities that 
created "a priority over any other class to a distribution of assets" could 
lead to "abuses ... when funds [are] leveraged without any significant 
limitations."121 But the potential "priority" of guaranteed shares to advi-
sor funds need not expose the unguaranteed (junior) class shareholders 
to the kinds of risk that might arise in leveraged funds.128 
The improved performance guarantee also does not implicate the 
concerns that motivated the adoption of fulcrum fee regulation in section 
205 of the IAA.129 The two primary worries of Congress were concerns of 
unfair excess compensation130 and concerns about excessive risk taking.131 
Performance guarantee fees raise neither issue. 
Because mutual fund fees are negotiated by boards of directors who 
often have close relationships with the advisors with whom they negoti-
ate, Congress has periodically become concerned about the level of fees 
in mutual funds as a matter of consumer protection. 132 The restriction on 
performance-based fees is part of this pattern. As described earlier, a 
performance guarantee fee is possible precisely because some mutual 
funds have lower fees than other, similar mutual funds, and these fees 
ensure that the low-fee fund will regularly outperform.133 The very fact 
that an advisor is willing to offer a performance guarantee fee arrange-
ment is evidence that the fee is not only fair, but substantially better than 
at least one option in the market. 
This argument has implications for the choice of benchmark as well. 
While the SEC usually frowns on a choice of benchmark that a fund is 
likely to beat,134 this concern is more apposite than the typical case where 
the base fee is itself comparable to the market average. Here, the base is 
substantially better than other fees in the market, and it is this cost ad-
vantage that ensures that the guarantee is viable. While the Vanguard 
can be expected to regularly outperform the MainStay fund, and inves-
tors who elect the guarantee shares will usually pay more than the base 
fee, the guarantee ensures that the consumers will always do better, even 
after this deduction. Put simply, if the MainStay fee structure is not ex-
cessive or unfair, then what policy reason can there be for obstructing a 
fee structure that is guaranteed to leave investors better off? 
127. Andrew J. Donohue, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech by SEC 
Staff: Investment Company Act of 1940: Regulatory Gap Between Paradigm and Reality? (April 17, 
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch041709ajd.htm. 
128. In particular, if the guarantee advisor obligations were cleared on a daily basis, as described 
infra at text accompanying note 145, the unguaranteed shareholders would need not bear additional 
risk from the possibility of advisor payments or early redemption of the guaranteed shares. 
129. See Factors to be Considered, supra note 115. 
130. Id. 
131. See Royce Value Trust, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 106. 
132. See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2012). 
133. See supra Part III.D. 
134. See Factors to be Considered, supra note 115. 
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In barring contingent fee arrangements, the SEC expressed con-
cerns regarding excessive risk taking.135 The particular concern of the 
SEC involves a fund that will earn no fees unless it beats the benchmark, 
but will not owe additional money, if it badly underperforms.136 This gives 
managers an incentive to make risky bets, since they will earn fees, if the 
bets pay off, and investors will bear the losses, if they do not. This con-
cern is, once again, absent in the case of a performance guarantee. In the 
case of a performance-guaranteed index fund, this concern is clearly mis-
placed. Since index funds are committed by their prospectus to attempt 
to match the index they track,137 risk-taking is not an issue. An actively 
managed guaranteed fund counsels more caution, but the particular form 
of risk-taking that concerns the SEC is absent. Since a performance 
guarantee requires that fund managers make up investor losses relative 
to the benchmark dollar for dollar, there is no temptation to make risky 
bets. If anything, managers might be risk-averse, since they bear one-
hundred percent of losses, and take only twenty percent of the upside. 
While a performance guarantee is novel legal territory, it is closely 
related to permissible fulcrum fees. Many of the policy concerns that 
have motivated the careful regulation of fulcrum fees are absent in the 
case of performance guarantees: fees are likely to be lower, not higher, 
and managerial risk-taking will be, if anything, somewhat cautious. Par-
ticularly in the case of low-cost index funds, the case for permitting per-
formance guaranteed share classes through a fulcrum-fee-style imple-
mentation seems strong from a policy standpoint. The SEC should 
encourage the use of this fee structure by issuing no-action letters and by 
issuing a staff release giving guidelines for the issuance of no-action let-
ters. In addition, the SEC should explicitly create a section 6 exemption 
for funds that offer differential guarantees on its share classes so as to 
avoid conflicts with section 18f.138 
V. CHALLENGES AND DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
This Part considers additional concerns and implementation details 
that would affect performance guarantees. 
A. Managing Risk 
The recent economic crisis has underscored the possibility that 
guarantors will breach their. promises to provide compensation when the 
135. See Contingent Advisory Compensation Arrangements, supra note 108. 
136. See id. 
137. See Choi et al., supra note 14, at 5. 
138. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (The Commission by rules and regu-
lations may exempt any class of transaction "from any provision or provisions of this subchapter or of 
any rule or regulation thereunder, if and to the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate 
in the public interest. ... "). 
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guarantee fails. 139 The financial crisis has also raised concerns about 
"Black Swan" risks that are not captured in the historical data.14° Con-
sumers and regulators (as well as readers) may be concerned that, de-
spite the evidence we have presented that performance guarantees are 
viable, they may nevertheless pose risks to the financial stability of mu-
tual fund advisors and therefore to the financial well-being of investors 
who rely on the guarantees. 
While the experience of the financial crisis counsels caution, the 
risks of a guaranteed performance regime are likely to be manageable. 
First, the implementation we have described, in which fees are adjusted 
on a monthly basis to ensure that returns meet the guarantee require-
ment for the previous year, ensures that fund companies and investors 
bear only one month of guarantee risk at a time. A shareholder who has 
stayed in the fund for twelve months is guaranteed returns that at least 
match the benchmark, and that guarantee must be settled through ad-
justments made at the end of that month. Even if the thirteenth month 
produces a deficiency that forces the fund advisor into bankruptcy, the 
guarantee for the preceding twelve-month period is secure. 
Regulators could go even further to secure the guarantee by requir-
ing that the fund advisor hold sufficient funds to settle the guarantee in a 
separate account at the end of each business day. If, on any day, the fund 
was unable to post a sufficient balance, then the fund would be immedi-
ately shut down with the account balance distributed to investors. Mutual 
funds already compute net asset value on a daily basis,141 so this type of 
settlement would fit well within the existing operational structure. Such a 
regime would ensure investors that only one-day's potential guarantee 
was ever at risk. Particularly in the case of low-risk guarantees on high-
cost index funds, such a regime would hardly be onerous, since the guar-
anteed fund would almost never underperform, and therefore almost 
never have to post a balance. 
Nor does the performance guarantee engender the type of systemat-
ic risks that surfaced during the financial crisis. Mutual fund assets are 
separate from their advisors' assets.142 The assets of a fund could never be 
endangered by the financial distress of the parent caused by paying a 
guarantee on another fund. There is therefore no channel of contagion 
139. For example, AIG wrote billions of dollars in credit default swaps that promised to pay in 
the event that underlying securities defaulted. When defaults became widespread, AIG was unable to 
pay its obligations and was eventually bailed out by the U.S. government. See generally, FIN. CRISIS 
INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION OF THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 344-
52 (2011) (discussing AIG's difficulties in meeting its investment guarantees without a government 
bailout). 
140. See generally Anthony H. Catanach, Jr. & Julie Anne Ragatz, 2008 Market Crisis: Black 
Swan, Perfect Storm or Tipping Point?, BANK ACCT. & FIN., Apr.-May 2010, at 20 (discussing use of 
the term "Black Swan" to describe the 2008 financial crisis). 
141. See Net Asset Value, U.S. SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/nav.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 
2014). 
142. John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Funds Struc-
ture and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1234 (2014). 
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by which a guarantee could endanger other funds. 143 Mutual fund advi-
sors that are full-service financial companies may have other contractual 
commitments that could potentially be endangered by a large guarantee 
payoff, but this risk too is small. If only one month, or even one day, of 
guaranteed funds is ever at stake, then the financial stakes are relatively 
low. Contrast this with the situation of "haircuts" in the repo market in 
which huge loans would become unavailable if banks were unable to 
meet margin requirements that were a small percentage of the loan.144 
Here, the contract is settled in full monthly, or even daily. While not risk 
free, a performance guarantee is dissimilar to the types of bets that 
caused the financial crisis. 
Guarantee contracts might also be structured to manage less pre-
dictable risks. For example, one of the primary risks in a performance 
guarantee would be that the benchmark fund might cut its fees or change 
its investing style. In a sense, the guarantee is to beat a particular fee 
structure and investment strategy; however, if the benchmark fund cuts 
its expense ratio in half, the guarantee might become unprofitably costly. 
To address this, guarantee contracts might make the guarantee contin-
gent on the benchmark fund not making these changes. If the fund were 
to explicitly alter its investing style or substantially lower its fees, the 
guarantee shares could simply liquidate (after settling any current payoff 
on the guarantee) and return the capital to the investors, or even transfer 
investors to a position in the benchmark fund. 145 Alternatively, the guar-
antee could be tied to the benchmark fund's expense ratio at the begin-
ning of each annual period. Under this alternative approach, the guaran-
tee is improved performance over what the investor would have earned, 
if the benchmark fund continued to charge the same historical expenses, 
decreasing the benchmark fund's expense ratio. The guarantee liability is 
determined by taking the benchmark fund's reported returns and ex-
penses and calculating what the benchmark returns would be, if it had 
incurred the historic expense ratio. 
It is more difficult for a guarantor to make a guarantee contingent 
on the investment strategy. Actively managed funds may engage in sub-
stantial strategy drift without changing their stated strategies. According-
ly, it may be in the joint interest of guarantors and guaranteed fund 
shareholders to provide the guarantor a call option to buy back the guar-
antee asset from the fund shareholder at an exercise price that would al-
low the shareholder to reinvest in the benchmark fund. In other words, 
the guarantee contract might grant the guarantor the right to premature-
ly terminate the guarantee and pay what amounts to compensatory dam-
ages. For example, imagine that our investor in MainStay's fund accepts 
Vanguard's guarantee and transfers $25,000 from MainStay's index to 
143. Financial contagion was a critical aspect of the financial crisis. See generally GARY B. 
GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 (2010). 
144. Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Haircuts (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 15273, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15273.pdf. 
145. See discussion of the termination of guarantees supra Part 111.B. 
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the Vanguard's. Moreover, imagine that three months later, the money 
invested in the Vanguard Index is now worth $26,000, but those same 
funds, if they had continued to be invested in the MainStay index, would 
have been worth $26,500. Vanguard might not know why MainStay's 
fund is beating its lower cost index, but regardless of the cause, Vanguard 
may choose to end the guarantee by adding $500 to the investor's ac-
count, which is just enough money for the investor to switch back to 
MainStay and reestablish her initial account. 146 The early termination op-
tion is an equitable way for guarantors to protect themselves from low-
probability risks that may not be captured by historic analysis of the 
guarantor's expected costs. 
The question of early termination points to a more general policy 
tradeoff in allowing guarantee carveouts. Carveouts may appropriately 
protect guarantors from bearing excessive risks, but, at the same time, 
anything that makes the guarantees more complex and contingent un-
dermines their effectiveness at speaking clearly to unsophisticated inves-
tors. 
B. Fund and Investor Opportunism 
One concern is that, if guarantors have some latitude to terminate 
guarantees, they will insincerely guarantee improved performance-not 
because they actually expect the returns of the guaranteed fund to ex-
ceed the returns of the benchmark fund, but because it is a means of ac-
quiring the investor's account. For instance, imagine that MainStay guar-
anteed that its higher-cost index would outperform Vanguard's lower-
cost index for three months, with the guarantee then withdrawn. Main-
Stay does not expect to make money from the guarantee. The guarantee 
is a loss leader dangled in hopes of acquiring funds for new accounts that 
would remain in MainStay's index fund or its other funds after the guar-
antee expires. Such "teaser" guarantees, which are akin to teaser interest 
rates on credit cards and mortgages,147 are a serious policy concern-not 
only because they may aid cognitively constrained investors in mistaken 
investments, but also because they weaken the transparent quality signal 
of guarantees. An important function of the improved performance 
guarantee is that it can reduce the promotional noise in the mutual fund 
markets. In our initial conception, potential investors see three types of 
funds: superior funds that guarantee superior performance to the 
benchmarked inferior funds, inferior funds that guarantee inferior re-
turns and are used as benchmarks by superior funds, and funds that nei-
ther make guarantees nor are used as benchmarks. In this conception, 
146. The guarantee might or might not include an additional amount to compensate the investor 
for the hassle of having to switch back and for possible tax consequences of the switch. Index funds 
tend to be highly tax-efficient, but guarantee compensation would itself be taxable if it exceeds the 
waiver of management fees. Since the tax consequences to individual investors would vary, it may not 
be possible to fully compensate investors for the tax consequences of the guarantee. 
147. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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potential investors should steer clear of the inferior fund, possibly prefer-
ring the first group of funds over the third. Short-term teaser guarantees, 
however, threaten to muddy this signaling equilibrium by giving higher-
cost funds a means of insincerely guaranteeing superior returns when 
they, in fact, expect to deliver. 
One way to address this issue is through close regulation of the 
baseline fee for guarantee-class shares. Since fulcrum fees generally re-
quire SEC preapproval through a no-action letter,148 the SEC is in a posi-
tion to ensure that the fee charged in the absence of a guarantee is actu-
ally lower than the benchmark fund. If the fees of the guarantee class 
shares are in fact higher, this should raise serious concerns that the moti-
vation for the guarantee is not in good faith, and the SEC is in a position 
to block such guarantees, and should. More generally, it would be rea-
sonable to ask prospective guarantors to demonstrate a reasonable pos-
sibility of success in outperforming the benchmark before permitting the 
issuance of guarantee shares. 
Bad faith guarantees are viable only if the guarantor can eventually 
terminate the guarantee. We have already identified cases in which ter-
minating a guarantee would be legitimate, such as style drift and fee 
changes.149 The termination of a guarantee obviously represents a sub-
stantial change in investment risk and should be handled carefully. There 
are two cases to distinguish. If at the time that a guarantee ends, the 
guarantee fund has failed to produce superior returns, regulation should 
require the guaranteeing fund to cash out the investor's shares and re-
turn the proceeds to the investor150 -unless the investor affirmatively 
consents at that time to retain those funds in the failed investment. The 
divestment default would help produce a separating equilibrium that in-
tentionally discriminates against insincere guarantees. Furthermore, 
MainStay could lawfully guarantee that its higher-cost index would out-
perform Vanguard's lower-cost index for some fixed duration of time. At 
the end of that guarantee term, however, MainStay would need to send 
the investor a check or enable the shareholder to reinvest in Vanguard's 
index, unless it could convince an adequately informed shareholder to 
continue in the underperforming fund on an unguaranteed basis. While 
leaving unaffected those guarantees that succeed in delivering superior 
performance, the prospect of losing most of the invested money at the 
end of the insincere guarantee will likely deter such teaser guarantees 
from being offered in the first place. The divestment default is likely to 
simultaneously support clarity in the guarantor's speech and further the 
investor's expectations. After all, individuals who invested and expected 
superior returns normally do not want to continue in an unguaranteed 
fund that is falling short of an achievable alternative. 
148. See supra notes 108-31 and accompanying text. 
149. See supra Part V.A. 
150. Alternatively, it might be possible for investors at the time of initially investing in the guar-
antee fund to give the fund non-discretionary instructions to sell fund shares and reinvest proceeds in 
the benchmark fund, if the guarantee failed. 
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The second instance is when the guarantee is performed as prom-
ised, but is terminated for reasons unrelated to performance. If Van-
guard guaranteed superior performance over MainStay's index and suc-
ceeded in delivering superior performance, but wished to terminate a 
guarantee share class because the target fund was liquidating, for exam-
ple, the case for forcing Vanguard to divest shareholders at the end of 
the guarantee is weaker. Forcing Vanguard to return the funds to the in-
vestors would provide strong protection against opportunism, but if those 
investments sit as cash due to investor inattention, such a regime may 
leave both Vanguard and the investors worse off. In that case, simply 
moving shareholders to the non-guaranteed shares in the same fund 
might be reasonable, provided shareholders are given clear notice of the 
change. 
Performance guarantee opportunism is not limited to investment 
advisors. Investors may behave opportunistically as well. In the guaran-
tee implementation we have described, investors can buy the guarantee, 
at any time, with the promise that if they hold them for twelve months or 
longer, their performance will meet or exceed the benchmark fund. In 
shorter intervals, they may exceed or fall short of the benchmark. One 
particular concern is that the fund advisor may need to pay into the fund 
to satisfy the annual guarantee, if the high-performance month rolls out 
of the twelve-month window and the most recent month is relatively low-
performance. The payment in such a case would exceed the shortfall in 
the most recent month, since it must make up for the poor performance 
over the entire year and the advisor will lose the offsetting effect of the 
thirteen-month old outperformance. An investor who buys guarantee 
shares during such a month would have a windfall if they are able to im-
mediately leave. To make matters worse, this would be a relatively pre-
dictable event, since the high-performance month and subsequent poor 
performance would be public information, only the performance during 
the final month would be in question. Investors who buy in anticipation 
of a payout and then redeem immediately could threaten the feasibility 
of guaranteed shares. 
Fortunately, this problem can be addressed through the use of re-
demption fees. 151 These "back-load" fees are costs incurred when inves-
tors redeem their shares.152 They are frequently used by mutual funds to 
deter short-term investing which can be costly for the fund. 153 For exam-
ple, a fund may charge a one percent fee to investors who fail to hold 
shares for a full year. Ideally, funds would impose redemption fees that 
just offset the unearned guarantee gains of investors who have invested 
for less than a year and have obtained a surplus payment as a result of 
151. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.27c-2 (2014). 
152. See id.; Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses, U.S. SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mffees. 
htm#redemption (last visited Nov. 6, 2014); Mutual Fund Redemption Fees, AUTORITE DES MARCHES 
FINANCIERS, http://www.lautorite.qc.ca/en/redemption-fees-conso.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). 
153. Short-Term Redemption Fee Policy, VALIC, http://www.valic.com/short-term-redemption-
fee-policy_3240_ 423145.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). 
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poor performance before they entered the fund. More simply, the fee 
could be set so that an investor who leaves the fund would do as well as 
the better of either the benchmark fund or the nonguaranteed shares, but 
no better. This type of adjustment is not contemplated by Rule 22c-2,154 
and, even if permitted, would require carefully tracking individual inves-
tor's tenure in the fund to adjust the fee at the investor level. All that is 
important to deter opportunistic behavior is that the fee exceed any un-
earned payout. Rule 22c-2 caps the fee at two percent, which is likely to 
be more sufficient in the vast majority of cases.155 After the consumer has 
spent a year in the fund, they have participated in all performance that is 
the basis for any fee adjustments and the redemption fee can and should 
be waived. 
C. 12b-1 Fees for Class Band C Shareholders and Capital Gain Taxes 
Another detail that must be considered is the impact of taxes and 
loads on investors departing from a benchmark fund in order to take ad-
vantage of the guarantee. If an investor switched to a guarantee fund, but 
incurred significant taxes or back-end loads in carrying out the transac-
tion, she may end up worse off, even if her performance on the assets ac-
tually invested in the new fund was guaranteed. The tax consequences of 
a transaction depend on facts about the individual investor that the guar-
antee shares cannot account for. Similarly, the way mutual fund sales 
loads are often implemented means that some investors may owe contin-
gent deferred sales charges when exiting a fund and the amount of these 
charges will depend on the length of time they had held the shares. If 
there are personal characteristics of investors that alter the consequences 
of leaving a fund, the guarantee might be misleading. 
We begin with a consideration of sales loads. Our early focus on the 
no-load, but high-fee, MainStay index understates the arbitrage potential 
for improved performance guarantees in one important dimension. 12b-l 
fees, which often add one-hundred basis points to the expense ratio, are 
deducted from fund assets that are usually paid to brokers.156 This 12b-l 
broker compensation is related to, and, in many ways, is a substitute for 
front-load fees. 157 While many load structures are in use, traditionally, 
many load funds issued two or three share classes.158 Class A shares might 
154. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-2 (2014). 
155. For actively managed funds, guarantee payouts did exceed two percent on an annual basis, 
but recall that guarantee class shares would be required to adjust fees at the end of each month to ac-
count for the previous year's guarantee. Thus, it is not the full guarantee amount, but just the amount 
of difference that must be paid out in a given month. 
156. FINRA rules permit a fund to pay 12b-1 fees up to 0.25% and still call itself "no-load." 
FINRA Conduct Rule 2830(d)(4) (2010), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display. 
html?rbid=2403&element_id=3691. 
157. Richard J. Dowen & Thomas Mann, Do Investors Benefit from 12b-1 Fees?, 22 AM. J. Bus., 
(2007); Jason S. Scoffield et al., SEC Proposes Changes to Rule 12b-1 Fees, BINGHAM (July 27, 
2010), http://www.bingham.com/ Alerts/2010/07 /SEC-Proposes-Changes-to-Rule-12b-1-Fees. 
158. Vikram K. Nanda et al., The ABCs of Mutual Funds: On the Introduction of Multiple Share 
Classes, 18 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 329, 341 (2009). 
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traditionally charge a front-load fee of five percent. This front-load is not 
included in the expense ratio. Investing $100 in such Class A shares 
means that $5 would be immediately deducted by the fund and paid to 
the broker as a transaction commission, and the client account would 
begin with an initial balance (and initial liquidation value) of $95. 
As an alternative to front-loads, many load funds would also offer 
Class B shares. Instead of charging a five percent front-load fee, Class B 
shares charge one percent 12b-1 fees for the first five years of investment 
and then automatically convert to Class A shares, without a front-load or 
any continuing 12b-1 fees. Class B shares often charge a "contingent de-
ferred sales load" or back-end load, if investors sold the fund before the 
end of the five years.159 These contingent back-end charges would typical-
ly decline over time to assure, either through 12b-1 or the back-end load 
fees, that the early exiting investor would pay a total of five percent in 
broker's commission.160 For example, an investor who decided to exit, af-
ter two years of paying one percent 12b-l fees, would typically need to 
pay a back-end load of three percent.161 
Contingent back-load fees seem to substantially impede the ability 
of a low-cost fund to guarantee that an investor would have more money 
in his or her account. An investor who had just invested $100 in Class B 
shares would have an account balance of $100, but would only be able to 
transfer $95 to the guarantor fund with the five percent back-end load 
fee. Thus, after a year, low-cost funds would not be able to guarantee 
that they could exceed the returns of a high-fee competitor by more than 
five percent. 
Nevertheless, a Fidelity or Vanguard fund could still guarantee an 
increase in liquidation value, if the Class B investor transferred funds. 
Holding Class B shares is economically equivalent to paying a five per-
cent front-load fee-albeit with a no-interest loan of this load amount 
back to the investor.162 The Class B investor pays back the loan through 
five one percent 12b-l fees or the contingent back-end load fees. As a re-
sult, at the time of investing, the Class B investor has fundamentally 
committed to a five percent load payment. Although the Class B investor 
had an initial account balance of $100, her initial liquidation value was 
$95; the cost is sunk. 
Some investor protection advocates may argue that low-cost funds 
like Fidelity or Vanguard offering guaranteed share classes are at risk of 
inducing an imprudent liquidation of Class B shares that would leave in-
vestors worse off after investor-specific loads are taken into account. This 
concern, however, misapprehends the unavoidability of these Class B 
five percent load fees. The Class B shareholder who waits five years be-
fore shifting to a lower-cost fund avoids the back-end load but is subject-
159. Id. at 334. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. This implicit loan earns interest at the same rate as the appreciation in the fund value (as the 
12b-1 fees and back-end fees are percentages of the future value of fund). 
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ed to five years of one percent fees. The key idea is that the lower-cost 
fund could profitably guarantee to improve the liquidation value of Class 
B shareholders at any point in the future. Far from a trick that lures un-
informed shareholders into unnecessarily incurring otherwise avoidable 
back-end fees, the improved liquidation value guarantee helps neutralize 
likely cognitive biases that inefficiently lock shareholders into bad in-
vestments. For example, shareholders who hyperbolically discount will 
inordinately value deferred payment of the load compensation. 
Capital gains taxes are also a concern. It is important to note that 
mutual funds distribute capital gains on transactions in the underlying 
portfolio to investors annually,163 so investors generally do not have large 
capital gains associated with mutual fund shares.164 Nevertheless, there is 
some residual concern that guarantees might induce investors in mutual 
funds to sell and mistakenly trigger the realization of capital gain. To the 
extent the capital gains tax obligation will eventually be realized, the ar-
gument is analogous to the case of loads. But, if both funds decline after 
the investor realizes the gain, then the investor making the switch might 
be worse off. Since this is an investor-specific tax issue, this could not be 
addressed through fund-level guarantees. 
This potential under-compensation is notable, but not fatal to the 
guarantee concept. It is still the case that, with respect to the dollars ac-
tually invested in the guarantee shares, those dollars will enjoy a higher 
return than if they remained in the benchmark fund. The risk that capital 
gains will be realized unnecessarily applies to any decision to sell a secu-
rity with a capital gain and is not unique to performance guarantees.165 
Though this problem should be small in most cases, in light of the regular 
distribution of capital gains, investors considering a switch to a guaran-
teed share class should be advised to exercise caution with respect to tax-
es. To the extent tax issues remain a concern, fund companies might offer 
guarantees in excess of one-hundred percent of the downside in ex-
change for a larger upside take, so that investors would have a better 
chance of being made whole even net of taxes.166 
Finally, there are substantial profit opportunities for low-cost funds 
to offer improved performance guarantees to Class C shareholders. Typ-
ically Class C shareholders are charged what is called a "level load" of, 
say, one percent a year for as long as they hold the fund. These level 
loads can offer Class C shareholders flexibility relative to Class B 
shares-as Class C shareholders who sell after one or two years to avoid 
the back-end fees of Class B ownership and might end up paying less to-
163. Morley & Curtis, supra note 30, at 113. 
164. Cf, John C. Coates IV, Reforming the Taxation and Regulation of Mutual Funds: A Compar-
ative Legal and Economic Analysis, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 591, 599 (2009) (discussing the problem of 
tax overhang). 
165. Clark M. Blackman II & Thomas C. Myers, Strategies to Consider for Securities with Large 
Capital Gains, AM. ASS'N INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS J., Aug. 1997, at 24, available at http://www.aaii. 
com/journaUarticle/strategies-to-consider-for-securities-with-large-capital-gains. 
166. See supra Part 111.D for a discussion of this alternative implementation. 
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tal broker commission. On the other hand, Class B shareholders who buy 
and hold for more than five years can end up paying a much higher total 
broker commission. 
From a profitability standpoint, Class C shareholders create the 
most lucrative opportunities for guarantors. Consider, for example, the 
Class C shares of Nationwide's S&P Index (GRMCX). Its Class C share-
holders are charged annual 1 % 12b-1 fees, which raises the fund's aggre-
gate annual fees to 1.18%. Thus, Vanguard has a 101 basis point ad-
vantage over Nationwide's index. 
From a policy perspective, however, improved performance guaran-
tees with respect to load funds might represent an inefficient form of 
"free riding." Stock brokers can provide valuable services in advising re-
tail investors on what types of investments are most suitable given the in-
vestors' investment goals and risk preferences. A broker who sinks the 
costs necessary to make these suitability determinations and directs the 
investor to an appropriate fund category runs the risk that an improved 
performance guarantee will prematurely end the broker's conversation. 
Similar to the lower-cost Internet seller who free rides on the brick-and-
mortar stores that take the time to guide consumers to the most suitable 
product, the guarantor of the lower-cost fund free rides on the broker. 
Such free riding can drive out the provision of valuable broker services.167 
Inefficient free riding is not a concern with regard to either Class A 
or B shareholders, because the brokers are guaranteed minimum com-
pensation. It is a possibility, however, with regard to Class C sharehold-
ers. But even with respect to Class C shares, the net effect of guarantees 
would likely be welfare-enhancing, with the primary effect being to alter 
broker compensation arrangements. We prefer a world where brokers 
more directly charge clients for providing advice. We want to discourage 
them from directing their clients toward Class C shares on investments 
that have lower-cost alternatives. 
By making certain types of commission compensation less attrac-
tive, performance guarantees may have a direct effect in improving the 
quality of investment advising. Investors commonly receive investment 
advice from two types of professionals: brokers and investment advi-
sors.168 Investment advisors are fiduciaries for their clients.169 We believe 
that the availability of a fund that is guaranteed to outperform a particu-
lar investment option would bar a fiduciary from recommending the 
dominated option to their client. The guarantee would therefore leverage 
the fiduciary duties of investment advisors to direct investors away from 
poor funds. Brokers, who are held only to a duty of suitability,110 fre-
167. See, e.g., Stanley I. Ornstein, Resale Price Maintenance and Cartels, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 
401, 409 (1985). 
168. ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPEcnVES ON INVESTMENT 
ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 7 (2008) available at http://www.rand.org/dam/rand/pubs/technical 
_reports/2008/RAND _ TR556.pdf. 
169. Id. at 13. 
170. Id. at 9. 
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quently recommend funds that carry considerable loads, since these loads 
comprise compensation for the broker.171 It is unclear that the existence 
of a guarantee to outperform a particular fund would bar a broker under 
a duty of suitability from recommending the dominated fund, but the ex-
istence of performance guarantees with respect to broker-sold funds may 
at least attract the attention of investors and lead them to question the 
quality of advice they are receiving. 
D. Collusion and Bonding Concerns 
Industrial organization economists are often on the lookout for "fa-
cilitating practices," which might superficially seem benign, but indirectly 
dampen incentives for firms to behave competitively.172 For example, 
Steve Salop has shown that most favored nation ("MFN") guarantees-
through which a seller guarantees that a particular consumer will receive 
the lowest price at which the seller sells-can reduce sellers' incentives to 
cut price generally.173 Nevertheless, improved performance promises op-
erate very differently. With MFN guarantees, a seller who cuts its price is 
forced to disgorge its own money; with improved performance guaran-
tees, a benchmark fund who cuts its expenses forces its guaranteeing ri-
vals to disgorge money. Improved performance guarantees are a poten-
tial mechanism to raise rivals' costs.174 The opportunity to weaken your 
competitor would give benchmark mutual funds an additional reason to 
reduce their fees to a more competitive level. Even though improved 
performance guarantees increase multi-market contact,175 it is unlikely 
that they would unwittingly retard firms' competitive impulses.176 Fund 
complexes might collude to refrain from offering such guarantees be-
cause the firms fear the probable procompetitive effects of the aforemen-
tioned guarantees. In that case, however, the problem would be the col-
lusion and not the guarantees themselves. 
171. Xinge Zhao, The Role of Brokers and Financial Advisors Behind Investments into Load 
Funds 1-2 (Dec. 2005) (on file with China Europe International Business School), available at http:// 
www.ceibs.edu/knowledge/papers/images/20060317 /2845.pdf. 
172. Steven C. Salop, Practices that (Credibly) Facilitate Oligopoly Coordination, in NEW 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 265, 272 (Joseph E. Stiglitz & G. Frank 
Matthewson, eds. 1986r 
173. Id. at 273. 
174. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' 
Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 223-24 (1986). 
175. See B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Multimarket Contact and Collusive Be-
havior, 21 RAND J. ECON. 1, 1 (1990). 
176. One also might worry that guarantees could be used as a collective punishment for a fund 
that was chiseling on some agreed minimum expense ratio. If all the other funds in an investment class 
agreed to guarantee superior performance to a particular benchmark fund, the targeted benchmark 
would have difficulty acquiring and retaining funds. Collective guarantee targeting would in some 
ways be analogous to the targeted base-point pricing punishments described by David Haddock. D. 
David Haddock, Basing-Point Pricing: Competitive vs. Collusive Theories, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 289, 
289-306 (1982). Base-point pricing punishments, however, are more feasible because the punisher's 
cost is much more attenuated. See Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: a Structural Theory of Self-
Enforcing Collusion, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 295, 295 (1987). 
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E. Some Alternative Structures 
We have described a guarantee as being provided directly by the 
lower-cost fund in which the investor is making the investment in the 
form of a class of guaranteed shares. Because the fund would control the 
investor's assets, it could directly deduct its compensation from any ex-
cess relative return. Moreover, as mentioned above, a recipient fund's 
guarantees can be used as a powerful account acquisition device.177 It 
would also be possible for intermediaries to offer guarantees and to con-
tract with the investor, and the new fund that the investor must invest in 
as a condition of receiving the guarantee. Guarantee intermediaries 
might also serve as the investor's broker or financial advisor and retain 
sufficient control over the investor's funds in order to efficiently harvest 
compensation from excess returns. Guarantee intermediaries might spe-
cialize in making the kinds of calculations necessary to assess the feasibil-
ity of particular guarantees, and they might be able to operate profitably 
without having to contract with the new funds that receive the investor's 
investment. 
To illustrate further, an intermediary might create a space where re-
tail investors auction their current fund accounts to the competitor who 
makes the most lucrative guarantee offer. For example, a "Lending 
Tree"-like intermediary could provide investors in the MainStay Index 
fund with the opportunity to offer the balances in their fund to competi-
tor complexes for potential guarantees. Vanguard might offer to guaran-
tee improved performance in return for nineteen percent of any excess 
return, and Fidelity might "bid" for the investors by offering improved 
performance in return for only seventeen percent of the upside. Similar 
to the guarantee, a structured auction will likely allow the investor not 
only to realize that MainStay's fund is dominated, but also to know 
which competitor is offering the most attractive guarantee. Competitive 
pressure in the auction can attenuate some of the concerns raised above 
regarding the possibility of overcompensating guarantors for putting 
competitive pressure on high-fee funds. In other words, when guarantors 
compete for your investment, you win.178 
While an intermediary-based approach to guarantees has some ad-
vantages, the legal obstacles to an intermediary-based guarantee scheme 
are higher than the share-class implementation. Current FINRA rules 
impose an absolute bar to performance-based compensation for financial 
advisors, including the types of fulcrum fees which we suggest could be 
used to implement a guarantee share class.179 Even if these rules were al-
177. See supra Part Ill. 
178. The reference is to the motto of lending tree, "When banks compete, you win." Stuart 
Elliott, With Economy Volatile, Financial Firms Start to Stress Stability, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/19/business/media/19adco.html?_r=0. 
179. FINRA Rule 2150(c) prohibits members from "shar[ing] directly or indirectly in the profits 
or losses in any account of a customer .... " FINRA Rule 2150(c) (2010), available at http://finra. 
complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=8692. 
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tered, guarantee contracts between investors and a third party where a 
financial payoff depended on the relative return would be a kind of fi-
nancial derivative,180 and might therefore fall under the scope of regula-
tions of over-the-counter derivatives.181 These legal hurdles lead us to fo-
cus on a share-class level guarantee. 
While the foregoing examples follow a quid pro quo construction 
(i.e., the guarantor covering one-hundred percent of relative downside 
risk in return for twenty percent of the excess upside), a myriad of other 
forms of downside protection and upside compensation is possible. Be-
sides changing the downside percentage of any shortfall in performance, 
including for guarantees of two-hundred percent or more, it is possible to 
pay the investor a fixed amount or a percentage of the initial investment 
when the guaranteed fund fails to outperform the benchmark fund. Simi-
larly, if the guaranteed fund produced superior performance, the com-
pensation could be structured as a fixed bonus to the guarantor. The 
guarantor can also charge a noncontingent lump sum or periodic fee for 
providing guarantee services. As discussed above,182 the particular form 
of the downside protection and guarantor protection will likely be driven 
by legal constraints on the guarantor. 
To summarize, we present an affirmative economic case to contend 
that improved performance guarantees can enhance mutual fund compe-
tition. Guarantees are not only feasible, but also likely to be profitable in 
the current environment. They offer cognitively limited investors with 
credible and highly salient information on the relative quality of different 
mutual funds. Not all mutual funds will offer guarantees or be the 
benchmark of other funds' guarantees, but the funds that are marked by 
credible guarantees as having inferior returns will face increased compet-
itive pressure to lower their fees or improve their performance. Indeed, a 
guarantee system may also make the brokerage and financial advisory 
markets more competitive. A broker or financial advisor who advises a 
client to invest in the shares of a fund that is guaranteed to produce 
poorer performance than another fund's is demonstrably failing to pro-
vide reasonable advice. Thus, while today's guarantees could produce 
substantial profits for the guarantor, a guarantee market would become 
less profitable in the long run-both because multiple guarantors would 
bid down the compensation for offering the guarantees and because the 
worst benchmarks would clean up their acts or exit the market. 
VI. BEYOND MUTUAL FuNDS: LOWER ALL-IN COST GUARANTEES 
Until now, we have focused on the use of improved performance 
guarantees in the mutual fund space. Nevertheless, the guarantee con-
cept has the promise of mitigating the back-end pricing problem that has 
180. Specifically, they would be a type of exchange option. 
181. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.lScl (2014) (rules and regulations governing over-the-counter deriva-
tives). 
182. See supra Part II. 
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plagued a wide variety of consumer markets. As discussed above,183 con-
sumers have difficulty recognizing and correctly measuring front-end and 
back-end prices, the latter of which are contingent on their future behav-
ior. Underestimating the probability that they will incur a back-end fee 
or the prospective disutility of bearing the fee (i.e., hyperbolic discount-
ing) may lead consumers to mistakenly prefer retailers with low front-
end prices but cognitively hidden back-end fees. 184 
Improved performance guarantees directly respond to this problem 
by giving sellers with higher front-end prices, but lower contingent back-
end fees, a new mechanism to credibly convey to consumers at the time 
of contracting their overall price advantage. As with the mutual fund 
guarantees, the guarantor calculates what the front-end and back-end 
fees would have been, if the consumer had used another competitive 
supplier and automatically rebates any excess charges. For example, a 
Verizon cellphone guarantee that promises lower costs than a user's ex-
isting AT&T contract over the next year can analogously promise to re-
bate one-hundred percent of any overage charges at the end of the year 
in return for receiving twenty percent of any relative savings. 
As when utilized by mutual funds, improved performance guaran-
tees can reduce the anxiety of changing providers. Thus, improved per-
formance guarantees are particularly well-tailored to respond to status 
quo bias by allowing the consumer to test the waters of a new supplier 
while guaranteed of retaining any pricing benefits of his or her former 
supplier. These guarantees thereby reduce the cognitive switching costs, 
which can impede market competition.185 Furthermore, these guarantees 
are valuable to unbiased but uninformed consumers who are trying to ef-
ficiently identify the lowest overall cost provider. 
This Part will analyze the ways in which improved performance 
guarantees can be applied to nearly a dozen different retail consumer 
markets. Implementing the guarantee idea in retail markets, however, 
raises three distinct information challenges that were largely absent from 
the mutual fund analog. Using cellphone and credit contracts as motivat-
ing examples, this Part highlights these potential implementation barri-
ers, which we call the "performance measure," the "counterfactual," and 
the "consumer prediction" problems. It then steps back and sketches the 
potential for these guarantees in a variety of specific consumer contexts. 
A. Three Informational Challenges 
To offer a meaningful guarantee of improved performance, a guar-
antee must be able to contractually define verifiable measures of seller 
performance. In the mutual fund context, while the return on assets is a 
183. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text. 
184. Ayres & Nale buff, supra note 23, at 25. 
185. Paul Klemperer, Markets with Consumer Switching Costs, 102 Q. J. ECON. 375, 376 (1987). 
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natural measure of fund performance, it is not the only measure.186 Mu-
tual funds might provide different qualities of service on other dimen-
sions such as redemption speed or the ergonomics of the web interface.187 
The "performance measure" problem occurs when the quality of seller 
performance is multifaceted, difficult to quantify, difficult to verify, or 
difficult to price.188 The greater the complexities in establishing a mean-
ingful performance measure, the less likely improved performance guar-
antees will create value. A Toyota Corolla could more feasibly promise 
lower all-in costs per mile driven than any Rolls-Royce model, but there 
are many other attributes besides cost that Rolls-Royce consumers care 
about. Improved performance guarantees in the consumer retail context 
will normally be "lower all-in cost" guarantees because the costs are a 
verifiable and easily priced aspect of the consumer experience. Lower 
cost guarantees are most likely to add value in markets where (1) at least 
some subset of sellers provides relatively homogeneous goods or ser-
vices, and (2) there is potentially substantial variation in contingent back-
end pricing. The first condition helps assure that nonprice competition is 
relatively muted, and the second condition creates the possibility that ex 
ante price competition may fail to capture the true, all-in cost of contract-
ing. 
The cellphone market represents such a context. The all-in cost of 
cellphone service is often difficult to assess ex ante given the cost of over-
ages and unused minutes. Even though there are differences in cellphone 
service quality as providers compete on coverage, clarity and reliability, a 
substantial segment of consumers may respond to a seller who promised 
them a lower all-in price. To illustrate, a Sprint customer who is offered a 
guaranteed lower price over the course of the next year by AT&T will 
realize that there may be quality differences in the two services. The con-
sumer armed with the guarantee, however, can more easily assess wheth-
er the quality difference is sufficient to warrant paying Sprint a higher 
fee. To the extent that the two services are comparable and that AT&T's 
service is superior, the guaranteed lower all-in costs should become dis-
positive. 
Even when all-in costs are salient, a guarantor must also have suffi-
cient information about the benchmark contract in order to calculate 
what a particular customer's all-in costs would have been with a competi-
186. See, e.g., Martin Eling & Frank Schuhmacher, Does the Choice of Performance Measure In-
fluence the Evaluation of Hedge Funds?, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 2632, 2634-35 (2007) (detailing differ-
ent performance measures for hedge funds and mutual funds). 
187. See Patrick Gleeson, What Is the Procedure for Redemption of Units in a Mutual Fund?, THE 
NEST, http://budgeting.thenest.com/procedure-redemption-units-mutual-fund-32645.html (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2014) ("Often you return the shares or a redemption coupon to the fund, but the procedure 
varies with the fund. A phone call to the fund's help line or sales line generally clarifies any procedural 
or address issues and may speed up the process."). 
188. Michael C. Jensen, The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964, 23 J. FIN. 389, 
390 (1968) ("[T]he lack of an absolute measure of performance, these past studies of portfolio perfor-
mance have been plagued with problems associated with the definition of 'risk' and the need to ade-
quately control for the varying degrees of riskiness among portfolios."). 
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tor. 189 This "counterfactual" problem is absent in the mutual fund appli-
cation, because mutual funds are legally required to disclose their returns 
on a timely basis.190 Thus, Vanguard can readily compute what an inves-
tor's account would have been worth if the investor had invested in a 
particular MainStay or Nationwide fund. In some consumer contexts, 
however, the counterfactual problem is more daunting, because infor-
mation regarding competitor contracts is more difficult to collect. For ex-
ample, credit card providers increasingly offer a proliferation of contrac-
tual terms that oftentimes vary by the individual consumer.191 
Even without legally-required public disclosure, a guarantor may be 
able to gain accurate information about a competitor's fee schedule, in-
cluding contingent back-end prices, by investigating the competitor's ad-
vertised terms and conditions of service. This kind of price auditing is al-
ready a routine part of many industries.192 The lower-cost guarantee 
normally specifies the assumptions it is making about the benchmark 
pricing.193 Indeed, one advantage of the all-in lower-cost guarantee over 
its mutual fund counterpart is that it is easier to hold constant the 
benchmark against which the guarantee is evaluated. In the mutual fund 
context, a guarantor bears the risk of the benchmark fund's strategy 
drift,194 but in the retail consumer context, an all-in lower-price guarantee 
can be limited to what a competitor's fees were at the time of the guaran-
tee. In essence, the guarantor is saying, "We guarantee that your com-
bined charges over the course of the year will be lower with us, than if 
you had continued to be subjected to our competitor's contingent fees." 
Basing the guarantee on contractual assumptions about the bench-
mark charges, however, creates opportunities for guarantor abuse. By 
overstating the competitor's front-end or back-end prices, the guarantor 
renders the guarantee less meaningful and induces consumers to switch 
allegiance on false pretenses. Accordingly, the law can require more rig-
orously that the guarantor's assumptions about the competitor's charges 
be made in good faith and might even require some degree of substantia-
tion. When the benchmark provider offers a variety of contracts, which is 
customary in the credit card industry, the consumer at the time of accept-
ing the guarantee may be asked to select his or her current type of 
benchmark contract. The collected information contributes to the as-
sumptions needed to calculate whether the guarantee failed. In addition, 
the law can require guarantors to offer benchmark providers the oppor-
tunity to correct mistaken assumptions used in the guarantee. With suffi-
cient procedural protection, guarantor assumptions can provide mean-
189. See Ayres & Nalebuff, supra note 23, at 28. 
190. See 31 C.F.R. § 1024.300 (2014); id. at§ 1010.430. 
191. See IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS: WHY THINKING-BY-NUMBERS IS THE NEW WAY TO BE 
SMART 14 (2007) (cardholder who threatens to discontinue card use may be offered individualized, 
lower interest rate to deter attrition). 
192. See PETER J. MCGOLDRICK, RETAIL MARKETING 379-81 (2d ed. 2002). 
193. See id. at 218 ("Most major retailers utilize benchmarking to compare their costs and produc-
tivity ratios with industry norms."). 
194. See discussion supra Part V.A. 
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ingful protection. Furthermore, perpetual advances in the ability of firms 
to capture, store, and analyze digital information suggest that the coun-
terfactual price requirement does not impede the ability of competitors 
to offer lower-cost guarantees. 
Finally, in deciding whether to offer a guarantee for the all-in cost 
of service, which includes the cost of back-end fees contingent on con-
sumer behavior, it is essential for the guarantor to form credible esti-
mates of the likelihood of particular consumer-driven contingencies. This 
"consumer prediction" problem is completely absent from the mutual 
fund context, because mutual fund investors' behavior does not impact 
their return. 195 As long as a shareholder remains invested, they will re-
ceive the same return as each of their peers. In contrast, the prevalence 
of the back-end pricing problem in retail markets has increased, particu-
larly when some consumers (and not others) incur late fees, when some 
consumers (and not others) incur charges for over or underutilizing the 
service, and when some consumers (and not others) incur charges for 
taking advantage of ancillary products or services.196 To make credible 
projections of a lower-cost guarantee's costs and benefits, the guarantor 
must be able to estimate the probability that consumers will incur these 
back-end fees. Without these projections, the guarantor will not be able 
to assess whether the guarantee is profitable. 
At a minimum, guarantors need historic information about consum-
ers' back-end behavior. For example, a guarantor in the credit card con-
text will want to know the probability that credit card users will incur late 
charges. In many contexts, guarantors will want to make individualized 
assessments about the likelihood of back-end charges and target seg-
ments of a competitor's demand that are especially likely to incur high-
markup back-end fees. To illustrate, when American Express considers 
whether to guarantee that its Green Card costs less than a traditional 
credit card, it would need to predict whether particular consumers were 
likely to pay late. The Green Card currently charges an annual fee of $95 
and late fees of "[u]p to $38" and if "you do not pay for two billing peri-
ods in a row, your fee will be $38 or 2.99% of the past due amount, 
whichever is greater."197 In contrast, although traditional credit card issu-
ers charge no annual fee, their interest rates currently average about 
fourteen percent and are sometimes more than twenty percent.198 Ameri-
can Express could not profitably guarantee that its Green Card would 
195. Joseph A. Franco, A Consumer Protection Approach to Mutual Fund Disclosure and the 
Limits of Simplification, 15 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1, 47 (2009). 
196. See, e.g., Dan Berthiaume, Ashley Furniture Upgrades Retail Management with Microsoft 
Dynamics, CHAIN STORAGE AGE (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.chainstoreage.com/article/ashley-
furniture-upgrades-retail-management-microsoft-dynamics. 
197. Terms, Conditions, and Disclosures, AM. EXPRESS, https://www304.americanexpress.com/ 
personal-card-application/terms/preferred-rewards-green-charge-card/25330-10-0/?print#terms-details 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2014). 
198. Chase Slate: Learn More and Apply, JPMORGAN CHASE, https://creditcards.chase.com/slate-
credit-card/leammore-apply?S81H=FH24R8 (last visited Nov. 6, 2014) ("A variable APR of 12.99%, 
17.99%, or 22.99% after the introductory period ends."). 
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cost less than a traditional credit card for users who never incur late fees. 
An absentminded cardholder with monthly charges of $10,000, however, 
who forgets to pay bills twice a year would be better off paying lower all-
in charges for using the Green Card ($95 + $70 = $165) than in using a 
traditional credit card with a twenty percent APR ($10,000*2*(.2/12) = 
$333). The more serious informational barrier for the guarantor is attain-
ing sufficient individualized customer information. While a guarantor can 
easily obtain abundant information about the back-end behavior of its 
own customers, it is more difficult to access high-quality information 
about competitors' cardholders. Nevertheless, in this digital age with rap-
idly growing technologies, detailed credit information is made increasing-
ly available by private-sector providers such as Fairlssacs and 
Experion.199 
Furthermore, even without individualized information, guarantees 
against competitors can be feasibly offered. The higher the markup on 
back-end services, the more room there is for an all-in cost guarantee. 
Alternatively, guarantors can guarantee that they will charge their aver-
age customer less than a benchmark competitor. These benchmarks 
could be supported with promises to pro rata rebate revenues if the 
guarantee of average all-in cost savings failed. Guarantors who cannot 
attain each consumer's back-end pricing risk at least know that their av-
erage consumer, or even a supermajority of their consumers, will have 
lower all-in costs. Such guarantees would be easier to implement in some 
cases, but might be less salient to individual consumers. 
Structurally, this problem of consumer prediction leads to an ad-
verse selection concern. Guarantees are a species of cost insurance. The 
guarantor, as the insurer, often wants to offer insurance to only certain 
consumer types, and this, in some cases, may make implementing con-
sumer guarantees challenging in some market contexts where they would 
otherwise seem useful. Somewhat surprisingly, the other traditional in-
surance obstacle-moral hazard-often militates in favor of lower-cost 
guarantees.200 The consumer who switches to a guaranteed service, which 
has lower back-end fees than the original benchmark service, is more 
likely to incur such charges because of the lower fees. Our absentminded 
credit card holder who was incurring credit charges of $167 for each late 
monthly payment is likely to defer payment, if she only has to pay a $38 
fee. Even though the isolated impact of the guarantee is to make the con-
sumer less likely to incur late fees, that effect is likely to be eclipsed by 
the impact of lower back-end contingent charges faced by the consumer. 
The guarantee takes the consumer's observed behavior as given and asks 
whether that behavior would have subjected the consumer to larger 
199. See AYRES, supra note 191, at 144. 
200. Adverse selection and moral hazard are often described as problems of hidden information. 
See ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 192-93 (3d. 
ed. 2001). These dual insurance concerns were not at issue with the improved mutual fund perfor-
mance guarantees, because investor types and investor behavior do not influence that probability that 
the insurance will need to be paid. 
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charges. It does not evaluate what the consumer's total charges would 
have been, if he or she had actually been subject to higher back-end 
fees. 201 
Stepping back, we see that the improved performance guarantee as 
applied to back-end pricing will be more prevalent if: 
1. non-price competition between the guarantor's products or 
services and those of the benchmark is muted; 
2. back-end charges prevent consumers from identifying the 
lower all-in-price; 
3. the guarantor can identify what the benchmark back-end 
charges would have been given a consumer's observed be-
havior; and 
4. before making the guarantee, the guarantor can credibly 
predict the likelihood that a consumer will incur particular 
kinds of back-end fees. 
Nonetheless, these conditions are not always satisfied. In our motivating 
example regarding credit card cost guarantees, the "consumer predic-
tion" problem, which creates adverse selection concerns, remains a non-
trivial obstacle to implementation. Our American Express example, 
however, also exemplifies the huge potential for lower-cost guarantees to 
improve competition. Credit card issuers like American Express face 
enormous difficulty in communicating the potential cost savings of their 
charge cards.202 To illustrate, a consumer with biased preferences in favor 
of traditional credit cards is bound to ask, "Why should I pay a $95 an-
nual fee when I can obtain a card that charges me nothing as long as I 
pay on time?" The answer to that question, as aforementioned, is that an 
ex ante guarantee simplifies consumers' choices, giving the consumer a 
credible signal that the charge card will have a lower all-in price notwith-
standing it's higher up-front annual fee. The consumer no longer needs 
to assess the probability of missing a future payment and paying a sub-
stantial late fee penalty, because the guarantee, in a sense, outsources the 
computation. 
B. Applications to Financial, Travel, Rental, and Service Transactions 
Although we have used credit card and cellphone service contracts 
as our motivating examples, the potential beneficial use of lower-cost 
guarantees extends to a wide variety of relational contracts, in which 
201. One might imagine guarantee contracts that leverage this moral hazard in ways that deceive 
consumers. For example, an unscrupulous issuer might offer a charge card to the absent-minded con-
sumer with an annual fee of $1000 and a late fee of minus $10 for paying thirty-days Iate-
guaranteeing the card to have lower costs than consumer's current twenty percent APR credit card. 
Because the guaranteed card perversely pays the consumer to be late, the guarantor might expect the 
consumer to be late almost every month-and this change in behavior would expose the consumer to 
very high interest charges, and hence make the guarantee worthless. The consumer is gulled into 
switching to the guaranteed, because one thinks they will have lower overall cost without taking into 
account the impact of their changed behavior. 
202. See David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Industrial Organization of Markets with 
Two-Sided Platforms 3 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 151, 157 (2007). 
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consumers' cash flow of payments extend over time. Here, we briefly dis-
cuss four of these different classes of contracts-financial, transportation, 
rental, and service contracting-where the prevalence of contingent 
back-end charges creates the potential for beneficial use of the lower-
cost guarantee. 
Many different consumer credit transactions have cognitively hid-
den back-end charges, including late fees and interest rate penalties.203 
Auto loans, payday loans, student loans, first and second lien mortgages, 
lines of credit, and rent-to-own transactions all share the core character-
istic of extended, contingent consumer payments over time.204 Consumers 
also enter financial arrangements with implicit lending instead of bor-
rowing that have analogous back-end fees. Thus, the size of ongoing 
management fees on whole-life insurance, annuities, and trust accounts 
can massively impact the relative performance of these financial prod-
ucts.205 
Consumer travel represents an arena where back-end pricing prob-
lems have become particularly prevalent.206 As mentioned above,207 
online comparison service providers such as Kayak and Expedia tend to 
focus narrowly on front-end prices when ranking products.208 Even if its 
all-in price is lower, a competitor who lowers its back-end charges by 
203. Paul Sisolak, 7 Secrets Credit Card Companies Don't Want You to Know, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Aug. 14, 2014, 8:54 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/my-money/2014/08/14/ 
7-secrets-credit-card-companies-dont-want-you-to-know. 
204. See Ben Apple, Differences Between a Home Equity Line and a Second Mortgage, 
REALTOR.COM, http://www.realtor.com/home-finance/homebuyer-information/differences-between-a· 
home-equity-line-and-a-second·mortgage.aspx?source=web (last visited Nov. 6, 2014) (describing how 
mortgage liens deserve careful consideration when assessing ability to repay the loan); Tony Guerra, 
What Does Rent-to-Own Mean?, HOME GUIDES, http://homeguides.sfgate.com/rent-to-own-mean-
8462.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2014) (discussing the pros and cons of renting-to-own); How Do I Pay 
Back My Personal Line of Credit?, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumer 
finance.gov/askcfpb/911/how-do-i-pay-back-my-personal-line-credit.html (last updated Sept. 4, 2012) 
(describing the best way to pay back personal lines of credit); Payday Loans, FED. TRADE COMM'N, 
http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0097-payday-loans (last visited Nov. 6, 2014) (detailing payday 
loan finance charges and annual percentage rates); Repayment Plans, FED. STUDENT AID, http://www. 
direct.ed.gov/RepayCalc/dlindex2.html (last updated Nov. 6, 2013) (detailing the different student 
loan payment plans); Understanding Vehicle Financing, FED. TRADE COMM'N, http://www.consumer. 
ftc.gov/articles/0056-understanding-vehicle-financing#terms (last visited Nov. 6, 2014) (describing the 
two financing options for auto-loans). 
205. See Paul Sullivan, Getting the Full Picture on Annuities and Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/ll/your-money/getting-the-full-picture-on-annuities-and-insur 
ance.html?pagewanted=all&_r=O; Revocable Trusts: Advantages, Disadvantages, and Myths, 
FIDUCIARY TRUST INT'L (Mar. 2007), http://fiduciarytrust.com/news/trust-and-tax-perspectives/ 
revocable-trusts.html. 
206. Caroline Mayer, 8 Ways to Combat Outrageous Hidden Travel Fees, NEXT AVENUE (June 13, 
2014), http://www.nextavenue.org/blog/8-ways-combat-outrageous-hidden-travel-fees. 
207. See supra notes 23--27 and accompanying text. 
208. It would, of course, be possible to include such prices in the search results, so why not just 
build a better search engine that highlights back end prices? Stated more broadly, why can't enhanced 
disclosure resolve these issues? In one sense, guarantees play a disclosure-like role in increasing the 
salience of certain back end terms. But guarantees can also be effective when consumers systematically 
fail to anticipate their own future behavior: how often they will make late payments or decide to pack 
an extra bag, for example. In these instances guarantees may induce switching, even with respect to 
salient terms. Moreover, guarantees function through competition, while disclosure often requires 
mandates. 
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raising its front-end prices would be ranked lower and lose price-
sensitive consumers.209 This front-end price competition has induced air-
lines, for example, to exclude an increasing number of amenities from 
basic travel packages.210 As a result, air travelers oftentimes encounter 
separate charges for meals,211 checked baggage,212 extra leg room,213 head-
sets,214 and cancellation insurance.215 Similarly, hotels are gaining an in-
creasing proportion of their revenues from ancillary back-end charges on 
every service, from Intemet,216 safe,217 and gym access218 to a growing ar-
ray of in-room items for sale.219 Likewise, car rental companies compete 
by offering lower front-end prices and then earning back the difference 
with back-end charges such as for gas (pre-paid or failing to refill tank)220 
and insurance (prepaid or failing to return without scratches).221 In all 
these contexts, the lower-price guarantee potentially gives the competitor 
a mechanism to reduce the front-end pricing distortion and to communi-
cate to consumers that they have a lower-cost service. 
Hotels and car rental companies are also examples of how rental 
markets necessarily involve cash flows of periodic consumer payments 
that create the opportunity for back-end pricing distortions. While video 
rental stores are disappearing, they provide another illustration of the 
application of lower-price guarantees. At one point, Blockbuster re-
ceived twenty-five percent of its revenues from late fees. Because of self-
serving biases and related cognitive distortions, there is a strong possibil-
ity that consumers may have underestimated the likelihood of having to 
pay these late fees. Indeed, the competitive success of Netflix's pricing 
209. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. 
210. See, e.g., Megan McArdle, Even Less to Like About Flying Coach, WASH. MONTHLY (May 
15, 2014, 9:43 AM), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/ten-miles-square/2014/05/even_less_to_like_ 
about_flying050356.php; Thom Patterson, Airline Squeeze: It's Not You, 'It's the Seat,' CNN (June 1, 
2012, 9:35 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/30/travel/airline-seats/. 
211. See, e.g., Airline Fees, KAYAK.COM, http://kayak.com/airline-fees (last visited Nov. 6, 2014) 
(listing the fees that all major airlines charge separate from the ticket price). 
212. See, e.g., id. 
213. See, e.g., id. 
214. See, e.g., List of Airline Charges for Domestic Flights, OPEN TRAVEL INFO, http://www.open 
travelinfo.com/area/uncategorized/complete-list-new-airline-charges-domestic-flights.html (last updat-
ed July 1, 2010) (listing the fees for all major domestic airlines). 
215. See, e.g., Trip Insurance, UNITED AIRLINES, http://www.united.com/CMS/en-US/products/ 
travelproducts/Pages/Triplnsurance.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2014) (describing United Airline's addi-
tional trip insurance option). 
216. See Sarah Schlichter, INDEPENDEN1'TRA VELER.COM, http://www.independenttraveler.com/ 
travel-tips/hotel-and-b-and-b/hidden-hotel-fees (last visited Nov. 6, 2014) (describing typical hidden 
back-end charges by many hotels and how to avoid incurring these charges). 
217. See id. 
218. See id. 
219. See id. 
220. See Hidden Car Rental Costs, INDEPENDEN1'TRAVELER.COM, http://www.independent 
traveler.com/travel-tips/car-travel/car-rental-hidden-costs (last visited Nov. 6, 2014) (describing the 
additional costs of renting a car that are not listed in initial price of the rental vehicle); see also Geoff 
Williams, The Hidden Costs of Rental Cars, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 4, 2014, 4:03 PM), 
http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/articles/2014/02/04/the-hidden-costs-of-rental-cars 
(discussing how the quoted price for a rental car is almost never what an individual will end up paying 
because of the hidden fees not contained in the initial quote). 
221. See Hidden Car Rental Costs, supra note 220; see Williams, supra note 220. 
No.1] IMPROVED PERFORMANCE COMPETITION 55 
model, which includes an all-in upfront price without late fees, implies 
the potential power of all-in cost guarantees in other rental contexts. 
Long-term car or home leases are additional examples. Furthermore, re-
tirement and assisted living markets create an especially fruitful "rental" 
context where lower-cost guarantees can aid consumers in making more 
cost-effective choices. Such industries often offer either "life estates" 
with higher upfront charges and lower back-end charges or rental options 
with higher back-end charges.222 Because seniors are often anxious about 
paying the higher front-end price, a "life estate" offer is more marketa-
ble, if it guarantees that the average consumer pays a lower all-in amount 
and promises prorated rebates, if the guarantee fails. 
Finally, there are a host of consumer service transactions that com-
bine a durable product with an extended service contract. Satellite dish 
and cable contracts garner substantial proportions of their revenue from 
back-end contingent pricing.223 Electronic readers such as the Kindle or 
Nook charge a mixture of upfront and back-end prices.224 Barnes and 
Noble can promise that the all-in cost of using the Nook is cheaper than 
using the Kindle, and then make a book-by-book calculation of what the 
cost would have been.225 Assured a better overall deal, consumers are 
more likely to take the plunge and invest in the durable good. Another 
classic antitrust concern with durable goods is that the dominant manu-
facturer of, say, copiers will cut prices to sell their machines and then 
charge supracompetitive prices in the aftermarket for toners and paper.226 
One legal reaction has been to increase competition in the aftermarket 
sales by prohibiting tying of toner or paper sales.221 The all-in lower price 
guarantee represents an alternative means to enhancing competition by 
giving competitors with tied back-end products the ability to credibly 
commit ex ante to more competitive pricing ex post. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Article has shown that improved performance guarantees have 
potential to enhance the competitive performance of a wide variety of 
markets. With particular emphasis on mutual funds, credit cards, and 
222. See, e.g., About Continuing Care Retirement Communities, AARP, http://www.aarp.org/re 
lationships/caregiving-resource-center/info-09-2010/ho_continuing_care_retirement_communities.html 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2014); Reva Minkoff, New Models for Assisted Living Provide More Affordable 
Care, REVERSE MORTGAGE DAILY (Dec. 28, 2009), http://reversemortgagedaily.com/2009/12/28/new-
models-for-assisted-living-provide-more-affordable-care/. 
223. See Amadou Diallo, Cable TV Model Not Just Unpopular but Unsustainable, FORBES 
(Oct. 14, 2013, 9:05 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/amadoudiallo/2013/10/14/cable-tv-price-hikes-
unsustainable/. 
224. Geoffrey A. Fowler, Price Cuts Electrify £-Reader Market, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704895204575320662842012510. 
225. For books that are available on the Nook, but not the Kindle, the guarantee might specify 
some default benchmark price or a formula based on the average Kindle book price. 
226. Severin Borenstein et al., Antitrust Policy in Aftermarkets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 455, 469-70 
(1995). 
227. Bruce H. Kobayashi, Spilled Ink or Economic Progress: The Supreme Court's Decision in 
Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 5, 23 (2008). 
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cellphone contracting, our analysis has focused on establishing that im-
proved performance guarantees can meet the individual participation 
constraints of the guarantor on one hand and of the consumer on the 
other. We illustrate how improved performance guarantees can be prof-
itably offered by a guarantor (and valued, notwithstanding the sharing of 
upside return, by the consumer or investor). We conclude that such 
guarantees are economically feasible because they can produce joint 
gains of trade. 
But the law-reform impetus for facilitating such guarantees stems 
from their probable impact on market competition. Improved perfor-
mance guarantees are likely to put enhanced, targeted pressure on the 
least competitive suppliers. High-fee mutual funds will be singled out by 
guarantees. Guarantees can improve market performance even for con-
sumers and investors who do not avail themselves of the guarantee pro-
tection. For example, some mutual fund holders, hearing of the guaran-
tee, will prefer to switch to the low-fee fund and capture one-hundred 
percent of the upside in relative return. Moreover, mutual fund or retail 
investors who have not heard of the investment might benefit from mu-
tual fund guarantees, because the guarantees are likely to make the pric-
ing behavior of benchmark funds more competitive. Indeed, even the 
threat of guarantees may be sufficient to deter some back-end pricing 
abuses. 
If improved performance guarantees enhance the gains of trade of 
both buyers and sellers, why are they not already offered in competitive 
markets? We end with two alternative answers that concern technology 
and law. First, it is possible that technological barriers to automatically 
calculating and rebating guarantee amounts loom larger than expected. 
A cellphone company that wants to implement a lower all-in cost guaran-
tee would have to expend a nontrivial amount for keeping track of its 
competitors' charges and applying the consumers' observed behavior to 
these hypothetical charges. To the extent that competitors' charges are 
contingent on aspects of consumer behavior not captured in the guaran-
tor system, the guarantor would need to start monitoring and analyzing 
additional variables. Technological advances in capturing and automati-
cally analyzing data, however, are likely to make improved performance 
guarantees more feasible from this transaction-cost perspective. Just as 
the real-time crunching of large datasets allows websites like Kayak to 
search and rank terabytes of data to produce rankings based on front-
end prices,228 the ability of guarantors to automate real-time crunching of 
back-end benchmark charges is likely to make the calculation of im-
proved performance guarantees increasingly feasible. Technological bar-
riers may provide one reason why improved performance guarantees 
have not existed in the past, but programming and computing innova-
228. See generally Michelle Higgins, Sites that Do Your Fare Digging, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/21/travel/21Prac.html? _r=0 (comparing the pricing results and pricing 
adjustments of several meta-search sites). 
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tions may create an opportunity for them in the future. 229 The reduced 
transaction costs in offering improved performance might mean that 
lawmakers can sit back and wait for laissez-faire competition to benefi-
cially disrupt these markets. 
An alternative hypothesis is that the law is impeding improved per-
formance guarantees from being offered. This is especially true with re-
gard to guarantees offered by financial intermediaries. As discussed 
above in Part IV,230 the IAA bars performance-based mutual fund fees in 
many circumstances, leaving fulcrum fees as the only exception. There is 
substantial uncertainty whether improved performance guarantees could 
fit within the fulcrum exception. The simplest legal reform might be a no-
action letter from the SEC making clear the legality of issuing new clas-
ses of guaranteed funds. Law reforms that facilitate first-party and third-
party implementation (via guaranteed funds and stand-alone guarantees) 
and that assure that the guarantees are credible could spark a new form 
of beneficial competition. It is an open secret among savvy financial in-
termediaries that certain mutual funds and retirement plans charge ex-
cessive fees. Facilitating "improved performance" competition would al-
low smart money to drive the worst actors from the marketplace. 
229. AYRES, supra note 191. at 19 (describing how the reduced cost of capturing storing and ma-
nipulating digital data has spurred revolution in predictive analytics). 
230. See generally, supra Part IV. 
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